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The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature

William James (1842–1910)

its essence, 465; petitional, 467; its effects, 474-477, 523. “Presence,” sense of, 58-63. Presence of God, 66-72, 272, 275 ff., 396, 418. Presence of God, the practice of, 116. Primitive human thought, 495. Pringle-Pattison, 454. Prophets, the Hebrew, 479. Protestant theology, 244. Protestantism and Catholicism, 114, 227, 330, 461. Providential leading, 472. Psychopathy and religion, 22 ff. Puffer, 394. Purity, 274, 290, 348. Quakers, 7, 291. Ramakrishna, 361, 365. Rationalism, 73, 74; its authority overthrown by mysticism, 428. Ratisbonne, 223, 257. Reality of unseen objects, Lecture III, passim. Récéjac, 407, 509. “Recollection,” 116, 289. Redemption, 157. Reformation of character, 320. Regeneration, see Conversion; by relaxation, 111. Reid, 446. Relaxation, salvation by, 110. See Surrender. Religion, to be tested by fruits, not by origin, 10 ff., 331; its definition, 26, 31; is solemn, 37; compared with Stoicism, 41; its unique function, 51; abstractness of its objects, 54; differs according to temperament, 75, 135, 333, and ought to differ, 487; considered to be a “survival,” 118, 490, 498; its relations to melancholy, 145; worldly passions may combine with it, 337; its essential characters, 369, 485; its relation to prayer, 463-466; asserts a fact, not a theory, 489; its truth, 377; more than science, it holds by concrete reality, 500; attempts to evaporate it into philosophy, 502; it is concerned with personal destinies, 491, 503; with feeling and conduct, 504; is a sthenic affection, 505; is for life, not for knowledge, 506; its essential contents, 508; it postulates issues of fact, 518. Religious emotion, 279. Religious leaders, often nervously unstable, 6 ff., 30;

their loneliness, 335. “Religious sentiment,” 27. Renan, 37. Renunciations, 349. Repentance, 127. Resignation, 286. Revelation, the anæsthetic, 387-393. Revelations, see Automatisms. Revelations, in Mormon Church, 482. Revivalism, 228. Ribet, 407. Ribot, 145, 502. Rodriguez, 313, 314, 317. Royce, 454. Rutherford, Mark, 76. Sabatier, A., 464. Sacrifice, 303, 462. Saint-Pierre, 83. Sainte-Beuve, 260, 315. Saintliness, Sainte-Beuve on, 260; its characteristics, 272, 370; criticism of, 326 ff. Saintly conduct, 356-377. Saints, dislike of natural man for, 371. Salvation, 526. Sandays, 480. Satan, in picture, 50. Scheffler, 417. Scholastic arguments for God, 437. Science, ignores personality and teleology, 491; her “facts,” 500, 501. “Science of Religions,” 433, 455, 456, 488-490. Scientific conceptions, their late adoption, 496. Second-birth, 157, 165, 166. Seeley, 77. Self of the world, 449. Self-despair, 110, 129, 208. Self-surrender, 110, 208. Sénancour, 476. Seth, 454. Sexual temptation, 269. Sexuality as cause of religion, 10, 11. “Shrew,” 347. Sickness, 113. Sick souls, Lectures V and VI, passim. Sighele, 263. Sin, 209. Sinners, Christ died for, 129. Skepticism, 332 ff. Skobeleff, 265. Smith, Joseph, 482. Softening of the heart, 267. Solemnity, 37, 48. Soul, 195. Soul, strength of, 273. Spencer, 355, 374. Spinoza, 9, 127. Spiritism, 514. Spirit-return, 524. Spiritual judgments, 4. Spiritual states, tests of their value, 18. Starbuck, 198, 199, 204, 206, 208-210, 249, 253, 258, 268, 276, 323, 353, 394. Stevenson, 138, 296. Stoicism, 42-45, 143. Strange appearance of world, 151. Strength of soul, 273. Subconscious action in conversion, 236, 242. Subconscious life, 115, 207, 209, 233, 236, 270, 483.

Subconscious Self, as intermediary between the Self and God, 511. Subliminal, see Subconscious. Sufis, 402, 420. Suggestion, 112, 234. Suicide, 147. Supernaturalism its two kinds, 520; criticism of universalistic, 521. Supernatural world, 518. Surrender, salvation by, 110, 208, 211. Survival-theory of religion, 490, 498, 500. Suso, 306, 349. Swinburne, 421. Symonds, 385, 390. Sympathetic magic, 496. Sympathy, see Charity. Systems, philosophic, 433. Taine, 9. Taylor, 246. Tenderness, see Charity. Tennyson, 383, 384. Teresa, Saint, 20, 346, 360, 408, 411, 412, 414. Theologia Germanica, 43. Theologians, systematic, 446. “Theopathy,” 343. Thoreau, 275. Threshold, 135. Tiger, 164, 262. Tobacco, 270, 290. Tolstoy, 149, 178, 184. Towianski, 281. Tragedy of life, 363. Tranquillity, 285. Transcendentalism criticised, 522. Transcendentalists, 516. Trevor, 396. Trine, 101, 394. Truth of religion, how to be tested, 377; what it is, 509; mystical perception of, 380, 410. “Twice-born,” type, 166, 363, 488. Tyndall, 299. “Unconscious cerebration,” 207. Unification of Self, 183, 349. “Union morale,” 272. Union with God, 408, 418, 425, 451, 509 ff. See lectures on Conversion, passim. Unity of universe, 131. Unreality, sense of, 63. Unseen realities, Lecture III, passim. Upanishads, 419. Upham, 289. Utopias, 360. Vacherot, 502. Value of spiritual affections, how tested, 18. Vambéry, 341. Vedantism, 400, 419, 513, 522. Veracity, 7, 291 ff. Vivekananda, 513. Voltaire, 38. Voysey, 275. War, 365-367. Wealth-worship, 365. Weaver, 281. Wesley, 227. Wesleyan self-despair, 108, 211. Whitefield, 318. Whitman, 84, 395, 396, 506. Wolff, 492, 493. Wood, Henry, 96, 99, 117. World, soul of the, 449. Worry, 98, 181. Yes-function, 261-263, 299, 387. Yoga, 400. Young, 256.

As with many ideas that float in the air of one's time, this notion shrinks from dogmatic general statement and expresses itself only partially and by innuendo. It seems to me that few conceptions are less instructive than this re-interpretation of religion as perverted sexuality. It reminds one, so crudely is it often employed, of the famous Catholic taunt, that the Reformation may be best understood by remembering that its fons et origo was Luther's wish to marry a nun:—the effects are infinitely wider than the alleged causes, and for the most part opposite in nature. It is true that in the vast collection of religious phenomena, some are undisguisedly amatory—e.g., sex-deities and obscene rites in polytheism, and ecstatic feelings of union with the Saviour in a few Christian mystics. But then why not equally call religion an aberration of the digestive function, and prove one's point by the worship of Bacchus and Ceres, or by the ecstatic feelings of some other saints about the Eucharist? Religious language clothes itself in such poor symbols as our life affords, and the whole organism gives overtones of comment whenever the mind is strongly stirred to expression. Language drawn from eating and drinking is probably as common in religious literature as is language drawn from the sexual life. We “hunger and thirst” after righteousness; we “find the Lord a sweet savor;” we “taste and see that he is good.” “Spiritual milk for American babes, drawn from the breasts of both testaments,” is a sub-title of the once famous New England Primer, and Christian devotional literature indeed quite floats in milk, thought of from the point of view, not of the mother, but of the greedy babe.

Saint François de Sales, for instance, thus describes the “orison of quietude”: “In this state the soul is like a little child still at the breast, whose mother, to caress him whilst he is still in her arms, makes her milk distill into his mouth without his even moving his lips. So it is here.... Our Lord desires that our will should be satisfied with sucking the milk which His Majesty pours into our mouth, and that we should relish the sweetness without even knowing that it cometh from the Lord.” And again: “Consider the little infants, united and joined to the breasts of their nursing mothers, you will see that from time to time they press themselves closer by little starts to which the pleasure of sucking prompts them. Even so, during its orison, the heart united to its God oftentimes makes attempts at closer union by movements during which it presses closer upon the divine sweetness.” Chemin de la Perfection, ch. xxxi.; Amour de Dieu, vii. ch. i.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Essays — First Series · Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) · IX. THE OVER-SOUL / THE OVER-SOUL

    One mode of the divine teaching is the incarnation of the spirit in a form,—in forms, like my own. I live in society, with persons who answer to thoughts in my own mind, or express a certain obedience to the great instincts to which I live. I see its presence to them. I am certified of a common nature; and these other souls, these separated selves, draw me as nothing else can. They stir in me the new emotions we call passion; of love, hatred, fear, admiration, pity; thence come conversation, competition, persuasion, cities and war. Persons are supplementary to the primary teaching of the soul. In youth we are mad for persons. Childhood and youth see all the world in them. But the larger experience of man discovers the identical nature appearing through them all. Persons themselves acquaint us with the impersonal. In all conversation between two persons tacit reference is made, as to a third party, to a common nature. That third party or common nature is not social; it is impersonal; is God. And so in groups where debate is earnest, and especially on high questions, the company become aware that the thought rises to an equal level in all bosoms, that all have a spiritual property in what was said, as well as the sayer. They all become wiser than they were. It arches over them like a temple, this unity of thought in which every heart beats with nobler sense of power and duty, and thinks and acts with unusual solemnity.

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason

    [43] The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity. From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. / SECT. I. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON.

    If we desire similar instances, it will not be very difficult to find them. The present subject of metaphysics will supply us abundantly. The same argument, which would have been esteemed convincing in a reasoning concerning history or politics, has little or no influence in these abstruser subjects, even though it be perfectly comprehended; and that because there is required a study and an effort of thought, in order to its being comprehended: And this effort of thought disturbs the operation of our sentiments, on which the belief depends. The case is the same in other subjects. The straining of the imagination always hinders the regular flowing of the passions and sentiments. A tragic poet, that would represent his heroes as very ingenious and witty in their misfortunes, would never touch the passions. As the emotions of the soul prevent any subtile reasoning and reflection, so these latter actions of the mind are equally prejudicial to the former. The mind, as well as the body, seems to be endowed with a certain precise degree of force and activity, which it never employs in one action, but at the expense of all the rest. This is more evidently true, where the actions are of quite different natures; since in that case the force of the mind is not only diverted, but even the disposition changed, so as to render us incapable of a sudden transition from one action to the other, and still more of performing both at once. No wonder, then, the conviction, which arises from a subtile reasoning, diminishes in proportion to the efforts, which the imagination makes to enter into the reasoning, and to conceive it in all its parts. Belief, being a lively conception, can never be entire, where it is not founded on something natural and easy.

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  • An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.

    This further is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not also a part of our complex idea of other spirits. Because, being capable of no other simple ideas, belonging to anything but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them, in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to THOSE WE RECEIVE FROM SENSATION AND REFLECTION, is evident from hence,—That, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds; which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness; or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such a power.

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  • Meditations · Emperor of Rome Marcus Aurelius (121–180) · BOOK

    IX. Toys and fooleries at home, wars abroad: sometimes terror, sometimes torpor, or stupid sloth: this is thy daily slavery. By little and little, if thou doest not better look to it, those sacred dogmata will be blotted out of thy mind. How many things be there, which when as a mere naturalist, thou hast barely considered of according to their nature, thou doest let pass without any further use? Whereas thou shouldst in all things so join action and contemplation, that thou mightest both at the same time attend all present occasions, to perform everything duly and carefully and yet so intend the contemplative part too, that no part of that delight and pleasure, which the contemplative knowledge of everything according to its true nature doth of itself afford, might be lost. Or, that the true and contemnplative knowledge of everything according to its own nature, might of itself, (action being subject to many lets and impediments) afford unto thee sufficient pleasure and happiness. Not apparent indeed, but not concealed. And when shalt thou attain to the happiness of true simplicity, and unaffected gravity? When shalt thou rejoice in the certain knowledge of every particular object according to its true nature: as what the matter and substance of it is; what use it is for in the world: how long it can subsist: what things it doth consist of: who they be that are capable of it, and who they that can give it, and take it away?

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason

    [46] There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought—of which they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life—after this life has ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several substances; and conversely, of the coalition of several into one simple substance. For, although divisibility presupposes composition, it does not necessarily require a composition of substances, but only of the degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the same substance. Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the soul—even that of consciousness—as diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it; and we can believe that, as in this case every thing that is real in the soul, and has a degree—consequently its entire existence—has been halved, a particular substance would arise out of the soul.

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