Skip to content
BookLens

The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature

William James (1842–1910)

Kellner, 401. Kindliness, see Charity. Kingsley, 385. Lagneau, 285. Leaders, see Religious leaders. Leaders, of tribes, 371. Lejeune, 113, 312. Lessing, 318. Leuba, 201, 203, 220, 246, 506. Life, its significance, 151. Life, the subconscious, 207, 209. Locker-Lampson, 39. Logic, Hegelian, 449. Louis, Saint, of Gonzaga, 350. Love, see Charity. Love, cases of falling out of, 179. Love of God, 276. Love your enemies, 278, 283. Lowell, 65. Loyalty, to God, 342. Lutfullah, 164. Luther, 128, 137, 244, 330, 348, 382. Lutheran self-despair, 108, 211. Luxury, 365. Lycaon, 86. Lyre, 267. Mahomet, 171. See Mohammed. Marcus Aurelius, 42, 44, 474. Margaret Mary, see Alacoque. Margin of consciousness, 232. Marshall, 503. Martineau, 475. Mather, 303. Maudsley, 19. Meaning of life, 151. Medical criticism of religion, 413. Medical materialism, 10 ff. Melancholy, 145, 279; Lectures V and VI, passim; cases of, 148, 149, 157, 159, 198. Melting moods, 267. Method of judging value of religion, 18, 327. Methodism, 227, 237. Meysenbug, 395. Militarism, 365-367. Military type of character, 371. Mill, 204. Mind-cure, its sources and history, 94-97; its opinion of fear, 98; cases of, 102-105, 120, 123; its message, 108; its methods, 112-123; it uses verification, 120-124; its philosophy of evil, 131. Miraculous character of conversion, 227. Mohammed, 341, 481. Molinos, 130. Moltke, Von, 264, 367. Monasteries, 296. Monism, 416. Morbidness compared with healthy-mindedness, 488. See, also, Melancholy. Mormon revelations, 482. Mortification, see Asceticism. Muir, 482. Mulford, 497. Müller, 468. Murisier, 349. Myers, 233, 234, 466, 511, 524. Mystic states, their effects, 21, 414. Mystical experiences, 66.

Mysticism, Lectures XVI and XVII, passim; its marks, 380; its theoretic results, 416, 422, 428; it cannot warrant truth, 422; its results, 425; its relation to the sense of union, 509. Mystical region of experience, 515. Natural theology, 492. Naturalism, 141, 167. Nature, scientific view of, 491. Negative accounts of deity, 417. Nelson, 208, 423. Nettleton, 215. Newman, F. W., 80. Newman, J. H., on dogmatic theology, 434, 442; his type of imagination, 459. Nietzsche, 371, 372. Nitrous oxide, its mystical effects, 387. No-function, 261-263, 299, 387, 416. Non-resistance, 281, 358, 376. Obedience, 310. Obermann, 476. O'Connell, 257. Omit, 296. “Once-born” type, 80, 166, 363, 488. Oneness with God, see Union. Optimism, systematic, 88; and evolutionism, 91; it may be shallow, 364. Orderliness of world, 438. Organism determines all mental states whatsoever, 14. Origin of mental states no criterion of their value, 14 ff. Orison, 406. Over-beliefs, 513; the author's, 515. Over-soul, 516. Oxford, graduate of, 220, 268. Pagan feeling, 86. Pantheism, 131, 416. Parker, 83. Pascal, 286. Paton, 359. Paul, Saint, 171, 357. Peek, 253. Peirce, 444. Penny, 323. Perreyve, 505. Persecutions, 338, 342. Personality, explained away by science, 119, 491; heterogeneous, 169; alterations of, 193, 210 ff.; is reality, 499. See Character. Peter, Saint, of Alcantara, 360. Philo, 481. Philosophy, Lecture XVIII, passim; must coerce assent, 433; scholastic, 439; idealistic, 448; unable to give a theoretic warrant to faith, 455; its true office in religion, 455. Photisms, 251. Piety, 339 ff. Pluralism, 131. Polytheism, 131, 526. Poverty, 315, 367. “Pragmatism,” 444, 519, 522-524. Prayer, 463; its definition, 464;

its essence, 465; petitional, 467; its effects, 474-477, 523. “Presence,” sense of, 58-63. Presence of God, 66-72, 272, 275 ff., 396, 418. Presence of God, the practice of, 116. Primitive human thought, 495. Pringle-Pattison, 454. Prophets, the Hebrew, 479. Protestant theology, 244. Protestantism and Catholicism, 114, 227, 330, 461. Providential leading, 472. Psychopathy and religion, 22 ff. Puffer, 394. Purity, 274, 290, 348. Quakers, 7, 291. Ramakrishna, 361, 365. Rationalism, 73, 74; its authority overthrown by mysticism, 428. Ratisbonne, 223, 257. Reality of unseen objects, Lecture III, passim. Récéjac, 407, 509. “Recollection,” 116, 289. Redemption, 157. Reformation of character, 320. Regeneration, see Conversion; by relaxation, 111. Reid, 446. Relaxation, salvation by, 110. See Surrender. Religion, to be tested by fruits, not by origin, 10 ff., 331; its definition, 26, 31; is solemn, 37; compared with Stoicism, 41; its unique function, 51; abstractness of its objects, 54; differs according to temperament, 75, 135, 333, and ought to differ, 487; considered to be a “survival,” 118, 490, 498; its relations to melancholy, 145; worldly passions may combine with it, 337; its essential characters, 369, 485; its relation to prayer, 463-466; asserts a fact, not a theory, 489; its truth, 377; more than science, it holds by concrete reality, 500; attempts to evaporate it into philosophy, 502; it is concerned with personal destinies, 491, 503; with feeling and conduct, 504; is a sthenic affection, 505; is for life, not for knowledge, 506; its essential contents, 508; it postulates issues of fact, 518. Religious emotion, 279. Religious leaders, often nervously unstable, 6 ff., 30;

their loneliness, 335. “Religious sentiment,” 27. Renan, 37. Renunciations, 349. Repentance, 127. Resignation, 286. Revelation, the anæsthetic, 387-393. Revelations, see Automatisms. Revelations, in Mormon Church, 482. Revivalism, 228. Ribet, 407. Ribot, 145, 502. Rodriguez, 313, 314, 317. Royce, 454. Rutherford, Mark, 76. Sabatier, A., 464. Sacrifice, 303, 462. Saint-Pierre, 83. Sainte-Beuve, 260, 315. Saintliness, Sainte-Beuve on, 260; its characteristics, 272, 370; criticism of, 326 ff. Saintly conduct, 356-377. Saints, dislike of natural man for, 371. Salvation, 526. Sandays, 480. Satan, in picture, 50. Scheffler, 417. Scholastic arguments for God, 437. Science, ignores personality and teleology, 491; her “facts,” 500, 501. “Science of Religions,” 433, 455, 456, 488-490. Scientific conceptions, their late adoption, 496. Second-birth, 157, 165, 166. Seeley, 77. Self of the world, 449. Self-despair, 110, 129, 208. Self-surrender, 110, 208. Sénancour, 476. Seth, 454. Sexual temptation, 269. Sexuality as cause of religion, 10, 11. “Shrew,” 347. Sickness, 113. Sick souls, Lectures V and VI, passim. Sighele, 263. Sin, 209. Sinners, Christ died for, 129. Skepticism, 332 ff. Skobeleff, 265. Smith, Joseph, 482. Softening of the heart, 267. Solemnity, 37, 48. Soul, 195. Soul, strength of, 273. Spencer, 355, 374. Spinoza, 9, 127. Spiritism, 514. Spirit-return, 524. Spiritual judgments, 4. Spiritual states, tests of their value, 18. Starbuck, 198, 199, 204, 206, 208-210, 249, 253, 258, 268, 276, 323, 353, 394. Stevenson, 138, 296. Stoicism, 42-45, 143. Strange appearance of world, 151. Strength of soul, 273. Subconscious action in conversion, 236, 242. Subconscious life, 115, 207, 209, 233, 236, 270, 483.

Subconscious Self, as intermediary between the Self and God, 511. Subliminal, see Subconscious. Sufis, 402, 420. Suggestion, 112, 234. Suicide, 147. Supernaturalism its two kinds, 520; criticism of universalistic, 521. Supernatural world, 518. Surrender, salvation by, 110, 208, 211. Survival-theory of religion, 490, 498, 500. Suso, 306, 349. Swinburne, 421. Symonds, 385, 390. Sympathetic magic, 496. Sympathy, see Charity. Systems, philosophic, 433. Taine, 9. Taylor, 246. Tenderness, see Charity. Tennyson, 383, 384. Teresa, Saint, 20, 346, 360, 408, 411, 412, 414. Theologia Germanica, 43. Theologians, systematic, 446. “Theopathy,” 343. Thoreau, 275. Threshold, 135. Tiger, 164, 262. Tobacco, 270, 290. Tolstoy, 149, 178, 184. Towianski, 281. Tragedy of life, 363. Tranquillity, 285. Transcendentalism criticised, 522. Transcendentalists, 516. Trevor, 396. Trine, 101, 394. Truth of religion, how to be tested, 377; what it is, 509; mystical perception of, 380, 410. “Twice-born,” type, 166, 363, 488. Tyndall, 299. “Unconscious cerebration,” 207. Unification of Self, 183, 349. “Union morale,” 272. Union with God, 408, 418, 425, 451, 509 ff. See lectures on Conversion, passim. Unity of universe, 131. Unreality, sense of, 63. Unseen realities, Lecture III, passim. Upanishads, 419. Upham, 289. Utopias, 360. Vacherot, 502. Value of spiritual affections, how tested, 18. Vambéry, 341. Vedantism, 400, 419, 513, 522. Veracity, 7, 291 ff. Vivekananda, 513. Voltaire, 38. Voysey, 275. War, 365-367. Wealth-worship, 365. Weaver, 281. Wesley, 227. Wesleyan self-despair, 108, 211. Whitefield, 318. Whitman, 84, 395, 396, 506. Wolff, 492, 493. Wood, Henry, 96, 99, 117. World, soul of the, 449. Worry, 98, 181. Yes-function, 261-263, 299, 387. Yoga, 400. Young, 256.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason

    [43] The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity. From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.

    Read in context
  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE CREED OF A SAVOYARD PRIEST

    Recollect that I am not preaching my own opinion but explaining it. Whether matter is eternal or created, whether its origin is passive or not, it is still certain that the whole is one, and that it proclaims a single intelligence; for I see nothing that is not part of the same ordered system, nothing which does not co-operate to the same end, namely, the conservation of all within the established order. This being who wills and can perform his will, this being active through his own power, this being, whoever he may be, who moves the universe and orders all things, is what I call God. To this name I add the ideas of intelligence, power, will, which I have brought together, and that of kindness which is their necessary consequence; but for all this I know no more of the being to which I ascribe them. He hides himself alike from my senses and my understanding; the more I think of him, the more perplexed I am; I know full well that he exists, and that he exists of himself alone; I know that my existence depends on his, and that everything I know depends upon him also. I see God everywhere in his works; I feel him within myself; I behold him all around me; but if I try to ponder him himself, if I try to find out where he is, what he is, what is his substance, he escapes me and my troubled spirit finds nothing.

    Read in context
  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE CREED OF A SAVOYARD PRIEST

    Thus it is that, in the contemplation of God in his works, and in the study of such of his attributes as it concerned me to know, I have slowly grasped and developed the idea, at first partial and imperfect, which I have formed of this Infinite Being. But if this idea has become nobler and greater it is also more suited to the human reason. As I approach in spirit the eternal light, I am confused and dazzled by its glory, and compelled to abandon all the earthly notions which helped me to picture it to myself. God is no longer corporeal and sensible; the supreme mind which rules the world is no longer the world itself; in vain do I strive to grasp his inconceivable essence. When I think that it is he that gives life and movement to the living and moving substance which controls all living bodies; when I hear it said that my soul is spiritual and that God is a spirit, I revolt against this abasement of the divine essence; as if God and my soul were of one and the same nature! As if God were not the one and only absolute being, the only really active, feeling, thinking, willing being, from whom we derive our thought, feeling, motion, will, our freedom and our very existence! We are free because he wills our freedom, and his inexplicable substance is to our souls what our souls are to our bodies. I know not whether he has created matter, body, soul, the world itself. The idea of creation confounds me and eludes my grasp; so far as I can conceive of it I believe it; but I know that he has formed the universe and all that is, that he has made and ordered all things. No doubt God is eternal; but can my mind grasp the idea of eternity? Why should I cheat myself with meaningless words? This is what I do understand; before things were—God was; he will be when they are no more, and if all things come to an end he will still endure. That a being beyond my comprehension should give life to other beings, this is merely difficult and beyond my understanding; but that Being and Nothing should be convertible terms, this is indeed a palpable contradiction, an evident absurdity.

    Read in context
  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.

    This opinion is certainly very curious, and well worth our attention; but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this place, if we reflect a moment on our present purpose in taking notice of it. We have established it as a principle, that as all ideas are derived from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, it is impossible we can have any idea of power and efficacy, unless some instances can be produced, wherein this power is perceived to exert itself. Now, as these instances can never be discovered in body, the Cartesians, proceeding upon their principle of innate ideas, have had recourse to a supreme spirit or deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter. But the principle of innate ideas being allowed to be false, it follows, that the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds. For if every idea be derived from an impression, the idea of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and if no impression, either of sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, it is equally impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the deity. Since these philosophers, therefore, have concluded, that matter cannot be endowed with any efficacious principle, because it is impossible to discover in it such a principle; the same course of reasoning should determine them to exclude it from the supreme being. Or if they esteem that opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it; and that is, by concluding from the very first, that they have no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object; since neither in body nor spirit, neither in superior nor inferior natures, are they able to discover one single instance of it.

    Read in context
  • The Works of Edgar Allan Poe — Volume 2 · Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849) · THE IMP OF THE PERVERSE

    In the consideration of the faculties and impulses—of the prima mobilia of the human soul, the phrenologists have failed to make room for a propensity which, although obviously existing as a radical, primitive, irreducible sentiment, has been equally overlooked by all the moralists who have preceded them. In the pure arrogance of the reason, we have all overlooked it. We have suffered its existence to escape our senses, solely through want of belief—of faith;—whether it be faith in Revelation, or faith in the Kabbala. The idea of it has never occurred to us, simply because of its supererogation. We saw no need of the impulse—for the propensity. We could not perceive its necessity. We could not understand, that is to say, we could not have understood, had the notion of this primum mobile ever obtruded itself;—we could not have understood in what manner it might be made to further the objects of humanity, either temporal or eternal. It cannot be denied that phrenology and, in great measure, all metaphysicianism have been concocted a priori. The intellectual or logical man, rather than the understanding or observant man, set himself to imagine designs—to dictate purposes to God. Having thus fathomed, to his satisfaction, the intentions of Jehovah, out of these intentions he built his innumerable systems of mind. In the matter of phrenology, for example, we first determined, naturally enough, that it was the design of the Deity that man should eat. We then assigned to man an organ of alimentiveness, and this organ is the scourge with which the Deity compels man, will-I nill-I, into eating. Secondly, having settled it to be God’s will that man should continue his species, we discovered an organ of amativeness, forthwith. And so with combativeness, with ideality, with causality, with constructiveness,—so, in short, with every organ, whether representing a propensity, a moral sentiment, or a faculty of the pure intellect. And in these arrangements of the Principia of human action, the Spurzheimites, whether right or wrong, in part, or upon the whole, have but followed, in principle, the footsteps of their predecessors; deducing and establishing every thing from the preconceived destiny of man, and upon the ground of the objects of his Creator.

    Read in context
  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.

    [6] Sect. 6. We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continued existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is formed, and principles from which it is derived. It is certain, that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence. It is also certain, that this very perception or object is supposed to have a continued uninterrupted being, and neither to be annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought into existence by our presence. When we are absent from it, we say it still exists, but that we do not feel, we do not see it. When we are present, we say we feel, or see it. Here then may arise two questions; First, How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated. Secondly, After what manner we conceive an object to become present to the mind, without some new creation of a perception or image; and what we mean by this seeing, and feeling, and perceiving.

    Read in context