The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature
William James (1842–1910)
Upholders of the monistic view will say to such a polytheism (which, by the way, has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still to-day) that unless there be one all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absolute only, all is saved. If there be different gods, each caring for his part, some portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolation would thus fail to be complete. It goes back to what was said on pages 131-133, about the possibility of there being portions of the universe that may irretrievably be lost. Common sense is less sweeping in its demands than philosophy or mysticism have been wont to be, and can suffer the notion of this world being partly saved and partly lost. The ordinary moralistic state of mind makes the salvation of the world conditional upon the success with which each unit does its part. Partial and conditional salvation is in fact a most familiar notion when taken in the abstract, the only difficulty being to determine the details. Some men are even disinterested enough to be willing to be in the unsaved remnant as far as their persons go, if only they can be persuaded that their cause will prevail—all of us are willing, whenever our activity-excitement rises sufficiently high. I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it. For practical life at any rate, the chance of salvation is enough. No fact in human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live on a chance. The existence of the chance makes [pg 527] the difference, as Edmund Gurney says, between a life of which the keynote is resignation and a life of which the keynote is hope.363 But all these statements are unsatisfactory from their brevity, and I can only say that I hope to return to the same questions in another book.
Absolute, oneness with the, 419. Abstractness of religious objects, 53. Achilles, 86. Ackermann, Madame, 63. Adaptation to environment, of things, 438; of saints, 374-377. Æsthetic elements in religions, 460. Alacoque, 310, 344, 413. Alcohol, 387. Al-Ghazzali, 402. Ali, 341. Alleine, 228. Alline, 159, 217. Alternations of personality, 193. Alvarez de Paz, 116. Amiel, 394. Anæsthesia, 288. Anæsthetic revelation, 387-393. Angelus Silesius, 417. Anger, 181, 264. “Anhedonia,” 145. Aristocratic type, 371. Aristotle, 495. Ars, le Curé d', 302. Asceticism, 273, 296-310, 360-365. Aseity, God's, 439, 445. Atman, 400. Attributes of God, 440; their æsthetic use, 458. Augustine, Saint, 171, 361, 496. Aurelius, see Marcus. Automatic writing, 62, 478. Automatisms, 234, 250, 478-483. Baldwin, 347, 503. Bashkirtseff, 83. Beecher, 256. Behmen, see Boehme. Belief, due to non-rationalistic impulses, 73. Besant, Mrs., 23, 168. Bhagavad-Gita, 361. Blavatsky, Madam, 421. Blood, 389. Blumhardt, 113. Boehme, 410, 417, 418. Booth, 203. Bougaud, 344. Bourget, 263. Bourignon, 321. Bowne, 502. Brainerd, 212, 253. Bray, 249, 256, 290. Brooks, 512. Brownell, 515. Bucke, 398. Buddhism, 31, 34, 522. Buddhist mysticism, 401. Bullen, 287. Bunyan, 157, 160. Butterworth, 411. Caird, Edward, 106. Caird, J., on feeling in religion, 434; on absolute self, 450; he does not prove, but reaffirms, religion's dicta, 453. Call, 289. Carlyle, 41, 300. Carpenter, 319. Catharine, Saint, of Genoa, 289. Catholicism and Protestantism compared, 114, 227, 336, 461. Causality of God, 517, 522. Cause, 502. Cennick, 301. Centres of personal energy, 196, 267, 523. Cerebration, unconscious, 207. Chance, 526. Channing, 300, 488. Chapman, 324. Character, cause of its alterations, 193;
scheme of its differences of type, 197, 214. Causes of its diversity, 261; balance of, 340. Charity, 274, 278, 310, 355. Chastity, 310. Chiefs of tribes, 371. Christian Science, 106. Christ's atonement, 129, 245. Churches, 335, 460. Clark, 389. Clissold, 481. Coe, 240. Conduct, perfect, 355. Confession, 462. Consciousness, fields of, 231; subliminal, 233. Consistency, 296. Conversion, to avarice, 178. Conversion, Fletcher's, 181; Tolstoy's, 184; Bunyan's, 186; in general, Lectures IX and X, passim; Bradley's, 189; compared with natural moral growth, 199; Hadley's, 201; two types of, 205 ff.; Brainerd's, 212; Alline's, 217; Oxford graduate's, 221; Ratisbonne's, 223; instantaneous, 227; is it a natural phenomenon? 230; subliminal action involved, in sudden cases, 236, 240; fruits of, 237; its momentousness, 239; may be supernatural, 242; its concomitants: sense of higher control, 244, happiness, 248, automatisms, 250, luminous phenomena, 251; its degree of permanence, 256. Cosmic consciousness, 398. Counter-conversion, 176. Courage, 265, 287. Crankiness, see Psychopathy. Crichton-Browne, 384, 386. Criminal character, 263. Criteria of value of spiritual affections, 18. Crump, 239. Cure of bad habits, 270. Daudet, 167. Death, 139, 364. Derham, 493. Design, argument from, 438, 492 ff. Devoutness, 340. Dionysius Areopagiticus, 416. Disease, 99, 113. Disorder in contents of world, 438. Divided Self, Lecture VIII, passim; Cases of: Saint Augustine, 172, H. Alline, 173. Divine, the, 31. Dog, 281. Dogmatism, 326, 333. Dowie, 113. Dresser, H. W., 96, 99, 289, 516. Drink, 268. Drummer, 476. Drummond, 262. Drunkenness, 387, 403, 488. “Dryness,” 204. Dumas, 279. Dyes, on clothing, 294. Earnestness, 264. Ecclesiastical spirit, the, 335, 338. Eckhart, 417. Eddy, 106.
Edwards, Jonathan, 20, 114, 200, 229, 238, 239, 248, 330. Edwards, Mrs. J., 276, 280. Effects of religious states, 21. Effeminacy, 365. Ego of Apperception, 449. Ellis, Havelock, 418. Elwood, 292. Emerson, 32, 56, 167, 205, 239, 330. Emotion, as alterer of life's value, 150; of the character, 195, 261 ff., 279. Empirical method, 18, 327 ff., 443. Enemies, love your, 278, 283. Energy, personal, 196; mystical states increase it, 414. Environment, 356, 374. Epictetus, 474. Epicureans, 143. Equanimity, 284. Ether, mystical effects of, 392. Evil, ignored by healthy-mindedness, 88, 106, 131; due to things or to the Self, 134; its reality, 163. Evolutionist optimism, 91. Excesses of piety, 340. Excitement, its effects, 195, 266, 279, 325. Experience, religious, the essence of, 508. Extravagances of piety, 339, 486. Extreme cases, why we take them, 486. Failure, 139. Faith, 246, 506. Faith-state, 505. Fanaticism, 338 ff. Fear, 98, 159, 161, 263, 275. Feeling deeper than intellect in religion, 431. Fielding, 436. Finney, 207, 215. Fletcher, 98, 181. Flournoy, 67, 514. Flower, 476. Foster, 178, 383. Fox, George, 7, 291, 335, 411. Francis, Saint, d'Assisi, 319. Francis, Saint, de Sales, 11. Fraser, 454. Fruits, of conversion, 237; of religion, 327; of Saintliness, 357. Fuller, 41. Gamond, 288. Gardiner, 269. Genius and insanity, 16. Geniuses, see Religious leaders. Gentleman, character of the, 317, 371. Gertrude, Saint, 345. “Gifts,” 151. Glory of God, 342. God, 31; sense of his presence, 66-72, 272, 275 ff.; historic changes in idea of him, 74, 328 ff., 493; mind-curer's idea of him, 101; his honor, 342;
described by negatives, 417; his attributes, scholastic proof of, 439; the metaphysical ones are for us meaningless, 445; the moral ones are ill-deduced, 447; he is not a mere inference, 502; is used, not known, 506; his existence must make a difference among phenomena, 517, 522; his relation to the subconscious region, 242, 515; his tasks, 519; may be finite and plural, 525. Goddard, 96. Goerres, 407. Goethe, 137. Gough, 203. Gourdon, 171. “Grace,” the operation of, 226; the state of, 260. Gratry, 146, 476, 506. Greeks, their pessimism, 86, 142. Guidance, 472. Gurney, 527. Guyon, 276, 286. Hadley, 201, 268. Hale, 82. Hamon, 367. Happiness, 47-49, 79, 248, 279. Harnack, 100. Healthy-mindedness, Lectures IV and V, passim; its philosophy of evil, 131; compared with morbid-mindedness, 162, 488. Heart, softening of, 267. Hegel, 389, 449, 454. Helmont, Van, 497. Heroism, 364, 488, note. Heterogeneous personality, 169, 193. Higher criticism, 4. Hilty, 79, 275, 472. Hodgson, R., 524. Homer, 86. Hugo, 171. Hypocrisy, 338. Hypothesis, what make a useful one, 517. Hyslop, 524. Ignatius Loyola, 313, 406, 410. Illness, 113. “Imitation of Christ,” the, 44. Immortality, 524. Impulses, 261. Individuality, 501. Inhibitions, 261 ff. Insane melancholy and religion, 144. Insanity and genius, 16; and happiness, 279. Institutional religion, 335. Intellect a secondary force in religion, 431, 514. Intellectual weakness of some saints, 370. Intolerance, 342. Irascibility, 264. Jesus, Harnack on, 100. Job, 76, 448. John, Saint, of the Cross, 304, 407, 413. Johnston, 258. Jonquil, 476. Jordan, 347. Jouffroy, 176, 198. Judgments, existential and spiritual, 4. Kant, 54, 448. Karma, 522.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Beyond Good and Evil · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · CHAPTER III. THE RELIGIOUS MOOD
47. Wherever the religious neurosis has appeared on the earth so far, we find it connected with three dangerous prescriptions as to regimen: solitude, fasting, and sexual abstinence—but without its being possible to determine with certainty which is cause and which is effect, or IF any relation at all of cause and effect exists there. This latter doubt is justified by the fact that one of the most regular symptoms among savage as well as among civilized peoples is the most sudden and excessive sensuality, which then with equal suddenness transforms into penitential paroxysms, world-renunciation, and will-renunciation, both symptoms perhaps explainable as disguised epilepsy? But nowhere is it MORE obligatory to put aside explanations around no other type has there grown such a mass of absurdity and superstition, no other type seems to have been more interesting to men and even to philosophers—perhaps it is time to become just a little indifferent here, to learn caution, or, better still, to look AWAY, TO GO AWAY—Yet in the background of the most recent philosophy, that of Schopenhauer, we find almost as the problem in itself, this terrible note of interrogation of the religious crisis and awakening. How is the negation of will POSSIBLE? how is the saint possible?—that seems to have been the very question with which Schopenhauer made a start and became a philosopher.
Read in contextThe Genealogy of Morals The Complete Works, Volume Thirteen, edited by Dr. Oscar Levy. · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
Take, for instance, certain kinds of diet (abstention from flesh), fasts, sexual continence, flight into the wilderness (a kind of Weir-Mitchell isolation, though of course without that system of excessive feeding and fattening which is the most efficient antidote to all the hysteria of the ascetic ideal); consider too the whole metaphysic of the priests, with its war on the senses, its enervation, its hair-splitting; consider its self-hypnotism on the fakir and Brahman principles (it uses Brahman as a glass disc and obsession), and that climax which we can understand only too well of an unusual satiety with its panacea of nothingness (or God:—the demand for a unio mystica with God is the demand of the Buddhist for nothingness, Nirvana—and nothing else!). In sacerdotal societies every element is on a more dangerous scale, not merely cures and remedies, but also pride, revenge, cunning, exaltation, love, ambition, virtue, morbidity:—further, it can fairly be stated that it is on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human society, the sacerdotal form, that man really becomes for the first time an interesting animal, that it is in this form that the soul of man has in a higher sense attained depths and become evil—and those are the two fundamental forms of the superiority which up to the present man has exhibited over every other animal. 7.
Read in contextPascal's Pensées · Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) · INDEX
man the, 83; different degrees in man's aversion to, 100; the pretext that it is disputed, 261; known by the heart, 282; we desire, 437; here is not the country of, 842; obscure in these times, 863 Types, 570, 642, 643, 644, 645, 656, 657, 658, 669, 674, 678, 686; the law typical, 646, 684; some, clear and demonstrative, 649; particular, 651, 652, 653; are like portraits, 676, 677; the sacrifices are, 679, 684 Tyranny, 332 Understanding, different kinds of, 2 Universe, the relation of man to the, 72; his superiority to it, 347 Vanity, is anchored in man's heart, 150; effects of, 151, 153; curiosity only, 152; little known, 161; love and, 162, 163; only youths do not see the world's, 164 Variety, 114, 115 Vices, some, only lay hold on us through others, 102 Virtues, division of, 20; measure of, 352; excess of, 353, 357; only the balancing of opposed vices, 359; the true, 485 Weariness, in leaving favourite pursuits, 128; nothing so insufferable to man as, 131 Will, natural for the, to love, 81; one of the chief factors in belief, 99; self-, will never be satisfied, 472; is depraved, 477; God prefers to incline the, rather than the intellect, 580 Words, and meanings, 23, 50; repeated in a discourse, 48; superfluous, 49, 59 Works, necessity to do good, 497; external, 499 World, the, a good judge of things, 327; all the, under a delusion, 335; all the, not astonished at its own weakness, 314; all good maxims are in the, 380; the, exists for the exercise of mercy and judgment, 583
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS
Thus we have established two truths without any obstacle or difficulty, that IT IS FROM NATURAL PRINCIPLES THIS VARIETY OF CAUSES EXCITES PRIDE AND HUMILITY, and that IT IS NOT BY A DIFFERENT PRINCIPLE EACH DIFFERENT CAUSE IS ADAPTED TO ITS PASSION. We shall now proceed to enquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser number, and find among the causes something common, on which their influence depends. In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature, which though they have a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by philosophers. The first of these is the association of ideas, which I have so often observed and explained. It is impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by its utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. But however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not entirely without rule and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produced by it. When one idea is present to the imagination, any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that introduction.
Read in contextThe Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason
[43] The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity. From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXIII. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.
37. Recapitulation. And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of SUBSTANCES OF ALL KINDS, wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident, First, That all our ideas of the several SORTS of substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas: with a supposition of SOMETHING to which they belong, and in which they subsist; though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all. Secondly, That all the simple ideas, that thus united in one common SUBSTRATUM, make up our complex ideas of several SORTS of substances, are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection. So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond those simple ideas. And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection; or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas, which we originally received from sensation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.
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