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The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature

William James (1842–1910)

The ideal power with which we feel ourselves in connection, the “God” of ordinary men, is, both by ordinary [pg 525] men and by philosophers, endowed with certain of those metaphysical attributes which in the lecture on philosophy I treated with such disrespect. He is assumed as a matter of course to be “one and only” and to be “infinite”; and the notion of many finite gods is one which hardly any one thinks it worth while to consider, and still less to uphold. Nevertheless, in the interests of intellectual clearness, I feel bound to say that religious experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as unequivocally supporting the infinitist belief. The only thing that it unequivocally testifies to is that we can experience union with something larger than ourselves and in that union find our greatest peace. Philosophy, with its passion for unity, and mysticism with its monoideistic bent, both “pass to the limit” and identify the something with a unique God who is the all-inclusive soul of the world. Popular opinion, respectful to their authority, follows the example which they set.

Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of religion seem to me sufficiently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not be solitary. It might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, of which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, with no absolute unity realized in it at all.362 Thus would a sort of [pg 526] polytheism return upon us—a polytheism which I do not on this occasion defend, for my only aim at present is to keep the testimony of religious experience clearly within its proper bounds. [Compare p. 132 above.]

Upholders of the monistic view will say to such a polytheism (which, by the way, has always been the real religion of common people, and is so still to-day) that unless there be one all-inclusive God, our guarantee of security is left imperfect. In the Absolute, and in the Absolute only, all is saved. If there be different gods, each caring for his part, some portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolation would thus fail to be complete. It goes back to what was said on pages 131-133, about the possibility of there being portions of the universe that may irretrievably be lost. Common sense is less sweeping in its demands than philosophy or mysticism have been wont to be, and can suffer the notion of this world being partly saved and partly lost. The ordinary moralistic state of mind makes the salvation of the world conditional upon the success with which each unit does its part. Partial and conditional salvation is in fact a most familiar notion when taken in the abstract, the only difficulty being to determine the details. Some men are even disinterested enough to be willing to be in the unsaved remnant as far as their persons go, if only they can be persuaded that their cause will prevail—all of us are willing, whenever our activity-excitement rises sufficiently high. I think, in fact, that a final philosophy of religion will have to consider the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously than it has hitherto been willing to consider it. For practical life at any rate, the chance of salvation is enough. No fact in human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live on a chance. The existence of the chance makes [pg 527] the difference, as Edmund Gurney says, between a life of which the keynote is resignation and a life of which the keynote is hope.363 But all these statements are unsatisfactory from their brevity, and I can only say that I hope to return to the same questions in another book.

Absolute, oneness with the, 419. Abstractness of religious objects, 53. Achilles, 86. Ackermann, Madame, 63. Adaptation to environment, of things, 438; of saints, 374-377. Æsthetic elements in religions, 460. Alacoque, 310, 344, 413. Alcohol, 387. Al-Ghazzali, 402. Ali, 341. Alleine, 228. Alline, 159, 217. Alternations of personality, 193. Alvarez de Paz, 116. Amiel, 394. Anæsthesia, 288. Anæsthetic revelation, 387-393. Angelus Silesius, 417. Anger, 181, 264. “Anhedonia,” 145. Aristocratic type, 371. Aristotle, 495. Ars, le Curé d', 302. Asceticism, 273, 296-310, 360-365. Aseity, God's, 439, 445. Atman, 400. Attributes of God, 440; their æsthetic use, 458. Augustine, Saint, 171, 361, 496. Aurelius, see Marcus. Automatic writing, 62, 478. Automatisms, 234, 250, 478-483. Baldwin, 347, 503. Bashkirtseff, 83. Beecher, 256. Behmen, see Boehme. Belief, due to non-rationalistic impulses, 73. Besant, Mrs., 23, 168. Bhagavad-Gita, 361. Blavatsky, Madam, 421. Blood, 389. Blumhardt, 113. Boehme, 410, 417, 418. Booth, 203. Bougaud, 344. Bourget, 263. Bourignon, 321. Bowne, 502. Brainerd, 212, 253. Bray, 249, 256, 290. Brooks, 512. Brownell, 515. Bucke, 398. Buddhism, 31, 34, 522. Buddhist mysticism, 401. Bullen, 287. Bunyan, 157, 160. Butterworth, 411. Caird, Edward, 106. Caird, J., on feeling in religion, 434; on absolute self, 450; he does not prove, but reaffirms, religion's dicta, 453. Call, 289. Carlyle, 41, 300. Carpenter, 319. Catharine, Saint, of Genoa, 289. Catholicism and Protestantism compared, 114, 227, 336, 461. Causality of God, 517, 522. Cause, 502. Cennick, 301. Centres of personal energy, 196, 267, 523. Cerebration, unconscious, 207. Chance, 526. Channing, 300, 488. Chapman, 324. Character, cause of its alterations, 193;

scheme of its differences of type, 197, 214. Causes of its diversity, 261; balance of, 340. Charity, 274, 278, 310, 355. Chastity, 310. Chiefs of tribes, 371. Christian Science, 106. Christ's atonement, 129, 245. Churches, 335, 460. Clark, 389. Clissold, 481. Coe, 240. Conduct, perfect, 355. Confession, 462. Consciousness, fields of, 231; subliminal, 233. Consistency, 296. Conversion, to avarice, 178. Conversion, Fletcher's, 181; Tolstoy's, 184; Bunyan's, 186; in general, Lectures IX and X, passim; Bradley's, 189; compared with natural moral growth, 199; Hadley's, 201; two types of, 205 ff.; Brainerd's, 212; Alline's, 217; Oxford graduate's, 221; Ratisbonne's, 223; instantaneous, 227; is it a natural phenomenon? 230; subliminal action involved, in sudden cases, 236, 240; fruits of, 237; its momentousness, 239; may be supernatural, 242; its concomitants: sense of higher control, 244, happiness, 248, automatisms, 250, luminous phenomena, 251; its degree of permanence, 256. Cosmic consciousness, 398. Counter-conversion, 176. Courage, 265, 287. Crankiness, see Psychopathy. Crichton-Browne, 384, 386. Criminal character, 263. Criteria of value of spiritual affections, 18. Crump, 239. Cure of bad habits, 270. Daudet, 167. Death, 139, 364. Derham, 493. Design, argument from, 438, 492 ff. Devoutness, 340. Dionysius Areopagiticus, 416. Disease, 99, 113. Disorder in contents of world, 438. Divided Self, Lecture VIII, passim; Cases of: Saint Augustine, 172, H. Alline, 173. Divine, the, 31. Dog, 281. Dogmatism, 326, 333. Dowie, 113. Dresser, H. W., 96, 99, 289, 516. Drink, 268. Drummer, 476. Drummond, 262. Drunkenness, 387, 403, 488. “Dryness,” 204. Dumas, 279. Dyes, on clothing, 294. Earnestness, 264. Ecclesiastical spirit, the, 335, 338. Eckhart, 417. Eddy, 106.

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking · William James (1842–1910) · Lecture VIII. — Pragmatism and Religion

    Of course as human beings we can be healthy minds on one day and sick souls on the next; and as amateur dabblers in philosophy we may perhaps be allowed to call ourselves monistic pluralists, or free-will determinists, or whatever else may occur to us of a reconciling kind. But as philosophers aiming at clearness and consistency, and feeling the pragmatistic need of squaring truth with truth, the question is forced upon us of frankly adopting either the tender or the robustious type of thought. In particular THIS query has always come home to me: May not the claims of tender-mindedness go too far? May not the notion of a world already saved in toto anyhow, be too saccharine to stand? May not religious optimism be too idyllic? Must ALL be saved? Is NO price to be paid in the work of salvation? Is the last word sweet? Is all 'yes, yes' in the universe? Doesn't the fact of 'no' stand at the very core of life? Doesn't the very 'seriousness' that we attribute to life mean that ineluctable noes and losses form a part of it, that there are genuine sacrifices somewhere, and that something permanently drastic and bitter always remains at the bottom of its cup?

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  • The Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer; Studies in Pessimism · Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) · T.B.S. / ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD.

    4 (return) [ See Parerga, vol. i. pp. 139 et seq.] Even though Leibnitz' contention, that this is the best of all possible worlds, were correct, that would not justify God in having created it. For he is the Creator not of the world only, but of possibility itself; and, therefore, he ought to have so ordered possibility as that it would admit of something better. There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this world is the successful work of an all-wise, all-good, and, at the same time, all-powerful Being; firstly, the misery which abounds in it everywhere; and secondly, the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man, who is a burlesque of what he should be. These things cannot be reconciled with any such belief. On the contrary, they are just the facts which support what I have been saying; they are our authority for viewing the world as the outcome of our own misdeeds, and therefore, as something that had better not have been. Whilst, under the former hypothesis, they amount to a bitter accusation against the Creator, and supply material for sarcasm; under the latter they form an indictment against our own nature, our own will, and teach us a lesson of humility. They lead us to see that, like the children of a libertine, we come into the world with the burden of sin upon us; and that it is only through having continually to atone for this sin that our existence is so miserable, and that its end is death.

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  • Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking · William James (1842–1910) · Lecture VIII. — Pragmatism and Religion

    The peace and rest, the security desiderated at such moments is security against the bewildering accidents of so much finite experience. Nirvana means safety from this everlasting round of adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the buddhist, for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid, afraid of more experience, afraid of life. And to men of this complexion, religious monism comes with its consoling words: "All is needed and essential—even you with your sick soul and heart. All are one with God, and with God all is well. The everlasting arms are beneath, whether in the world of finite appearances you seem to fail or to succeed." There can be no doubt that when men are reduced to their last sick extremity absolutism is the only saving scheme. Pluralistic moralism simply makes their teeth chatter, it refrigerates the very heart within their breast. So we see concretely two types of religion in sharp contrast. Using our old terms of comparison, we may say that the absolutistic scheme appeals to the tender-minded while the pluralistic scheme appeals to the tough. Many persons would refuse to call the pluralistic scheme religious at all. They would call it moralistic, and would apply the word religious to the monistic scheme alone. Religion in the sense of self-surrender, and moralism in the sense of self-sufficingness, have been pitted against each other as incompatibles frequently enough in the history of human thought.

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  • Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking · William James (1842–1910) · Lecture VIII. — Pragmatism and Religion

    Is then this you of yous, this absolutely real world, this unity that yields the moral inspiration and has the religious value, to be taken monistically or pluralistically? Is it ante rem or in rebus? Is it a principle or an end, an absolute or an ultimate, a first or a last? Does it make you look forward or lie back? It is certainly worth while not to clump the two things together, for if discriminated, they have decidedly diverse meanings for life. Please observe that the whole dilemma revolves pragmatically about the notion of the world's possibilities. Intellectually, rationalism invokes its absolute principle of unity as a ground of possibility for the many facts. Emotionally, it sees it as a container and limiter of possibilities, a guarantee that the upshot shall be good. Taken in this way, the absolute makes all good things certain, and all bad things impossible (in the eternal, namely), and may be said to transmute the entire category of possibility into categories more secure. One sees at this point that the great religious difference lies between the men who insist that the world MUST AND SHALL BE, and those who are contented with believing that the world MAY BE, saved. The whole clash of rationalistic and empiricist religion is thus over the validity of possibility. It is necessary therefore to begin by focusing upon that word. What may the word 'possible' definitely mean?

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  • The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief

    Thus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life; for, if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished to find. All knowledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be communicated; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say: It is morally certain that there is a God, etc., but: I am morally certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter.

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  • Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking · William James (1842–1910) · Lecture VIII. — Pragmatism and Religion

    As a matter of fact countless human imaginations live in this moralistic and epic kind of a universe, and find its disseminated and strung-along successes sufficient for their rational needs. There is a finely translated epigram in the greek anthology which admirably expresses this state of mind, this acceptance of loss as unatoned for, even tho the lost element might be one's self: "A shipwrecked sailor, buried on this coast, Bids you set sail. Full many a gallant bark, when we were lost, Weathered the gale." Those puritans who answered 'yes' to the question: Are you willing to be damned for God's glory? were in this objective and magnanimous condition of mind. The way of escape from evil on this system is NOT by getting it 'aufgehoben,' or preserved in the whole as an element essential but 'overcome.' It is by dropping it out altogether, throwing it overboard and getting beyond it, helping to make a universe that shall forget its very place and name. It is then perfectly possible to accept sincerely a drastic kind of a universe from which the element of 'seriousness' is not to be expelled. Whoso does so is, it seems to me, a genuine pragmatist. He is willing to live on a scheme of uncertified possibilities which he trusts; willing to pay with his own person, if need be, for the realization of the ideals which he frames.

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