Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
But there is also in me a certain Passive Faculty of sense, or of Receiving and Knowing the Ideas of sensible Things; of which Faculty I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certain Active Faculty of Producing and Effecting those Ideas. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no Understanding, and those Ideas are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against my Will. There remains therefore no Place for this Active Faculty, but that it should be in some substance different from me. In which because all the Reallity, which is contain’d Objectively in the Ideas Produced by that Faculty, ought to be contain’d Formally or Eminently (as I have Formerly taken notice) this substance must be either a Body (in which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain’d Formally) or it Must Be God, or some Creature more excellent then a Body (In which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain’d Eminently). But seeing that God is not a Deceivour, ’tis altogether Manifest, that he does not Place these Ideas in me either Immediately from himself, or Mediately from any other Creature, wherein their Objective Reallity is not * contain’d Formally, but only Eminently. And seeing God has given me no Faculty to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from Corporeal or Incorporeal Beings, but rather a strong Inclination to believe that they are sent from Corporeal Beings, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any Where, but from Corporeal Things. Therefore we must conclude that there are Corporeal Beings. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by my sense (for Perception by sense is in many Things very Obscure and Confused) but those things at least, which I clearly and distinctly Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the Object of Pure Mathematicks; those things I say at least are True.
As to What Remains, They are either some Particulars, as that the Sun is of such a Bigness or Shape, &c. or they are Things less Clearly Understood, as Light, Sound, Pain, &c. And tho these and such like Things may be very Doubtful and Uncertain, yet because God is not a Deceiver, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be false unless God has Given me some Faculty or other to Correct my Error, hence ’tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining Truth even in these very Things. And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever I am taught by Nature has something therein of Truth. By Nature in General I understand either God himself, or the Coordination of Creatures Made by God. By my Own Nature in Particular I understand the Complexion or Association of all those things which are given me by God.
Now there is nothing that this my Nature teaches me more expresly then that I have a Body, Which is not Well when I feel Pain, that this Body wants Meat or Drink When I am Hungry or Dry, &c. And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are True. And by this sense of Pain, Hunger, Thirst, &c. My Nature tells me that I am not in my Body, as a Mariner is in his Ship, but that I am most nighly conjoyn’d thereto, and as it were Blended therewith; so that I with It make up one thing; For Otherwise, when the Body were hurt, I, who am only a Thinking Thing, should not therefore feel Pain, but should only perceive the Hurt with the Eye of my Understanding (as a Mariner perceives by his sight whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the Body wants either Meat or Drink, I should only Understand this want, but should not have the Confused sense of Hunger or Thirst; I call them Confused, for certainly the Sense of Thirst, Hunger, Pain, &c. are only Confused Modes or Manners of Thought arising from the Union and (as it were) mixture of the Mind and Body.
I am taught also by Nature, that there are many other Bodies Without and About my Body, some whereof are to be desired, others are to be Avoided. And because that I Perceive very Different Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tasts, Heat, Hardness, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are Correspondent Differences in Bodies, from which these different perceptions of sense proceed, tho perhaps not Alike. And because that some of these perceptions are Pleasant, others Unpleasant, ’tis evidently certain, that my Body, or rather my Whole self (as I am compounded of a Mind and Body) am liable to be Affected by these Bodies which encompass me about.
There are many Other Things Also which Nature seems to teach Me, but Really I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an ill use of Passing my Judgement Inconsiderately, and from hence it is that these things happen often to be false; as that all space is Empty, in which I find nothing that works upon my Senses; That in a hot Body there is something like the Idea of Heat which is in me; That in a White or Green Body there is the same Whiteness or Greenness which I perceive; And the same Taste in a bitter or sweet Thing, &c. That Stars, Castles, and Other Remote Bodies are of the same Bigness and Shape, as they are Represented to my senses: and such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannot Distinctly perceive, it behoves me here to determine more Accurately What I mean when I say, That I am taught a Thing by Nature.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Confessions of St. Augustine · of Hippo Augustine (354–430) · BOOK X
This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic. But while I am passing from the discomfort of emptiness to the content of replenishing, in the very passage the snare of concupiscence besets me. For that passing, is pleasure, nor is there any other way to pass thither, whither we needs must pass. And health being the cause of eating and drinking, there joineth itself as an attendant a dangerous pleasure, which mostly endeavours to go before it, so that I may for her sake do what I say I do, or wish to do, for health's sake. Nor have each the same measure; for what is enough for health, is too little for pleasure. And oft it is uncertain, whether it be the necessary care of the body which is yet asking for sustenance, or whether a voluptuous deceivableness of greediness is proffering its services. In this uncertainty the unhappy soul rejoiceth, and therein prepares an excuse to shield itself, glad that it appeareth not what sufficeth for the moderation of health, that under the cloak of health, it may disguise the matter of gratification. These temptations I daily endeavour to resist, and I call on Thy right hand, and to Thee do I refer my perplexities; because I have as yet no settled counsel herein.
Read in contextSeneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER XXIV. CONSOLATION AGAINST BANISHMENT AND BODILY PAIN.
In the case of pain or sickness, it is only the body that is affected; it may take off the speed of a footman, or bind the hands of a cobbler, but the mind is still at liberty to hear, learn, teach, advise, and to do other good offices. It is an example of public benefit, a man that is in pain and patient. Virtue may show itself as well in the bed as in the field; and he that cheerfully encounters the terrors of death and corporal anguish, is as great a man as he that most generously hazards himself in a battle. A disease, it is true, bars us of some pleasures, but procures us others. Drink is never so grateful to us as in a burning fever; nor meat, as when we have fasted ourselves sharp and hungry. The patient may be forbidden some sensual satisfaction, but no physician will forbid us the delight of the mind. Shall we call any sick man miserable, because he must give over his intemperance of wine and gluttony, and betake himself to a diet of more sobriety, and less expense; and abandon his luxury, which is the distemper of the mind as well as of the body? It is troublesome, I know, at first, to abstain from the pleasures we have been used to, and to endure hunger and thirst; but in a little time we lose the very appetite, and it is no trouble then to be without that which we do not desire.
Read in contextUtopia · Thomas More (1478–1535) · OF THE TRAVELLING OF THE UTOPIANS
And if any should say that sickness is not really pain, but that it only carries pain along with it, they look upon that as a fetch of subtlety that does not much alter the matter. It is all one, in their opinion, whether it be said that health is in itself a pleasure, or that it begets a pleasure, as fire gives heat, so it be granted that all those whose health is entire have a true pleasure in the enjoyment of it. And they reason thus:—‘What is the pleasure of eating, but that a man’s health, which had been weakened, does, with the assistance of food, drive away hunger, and so recruiting itself, recovers its former vigour? And being thus refreshed it finds a pleasure in that conflict; and if the conflict is pleasure, the victory must yet breed a greater pleasure, except we fancy that it becomes stupid as soon as it has obtained that which it pursued, and so neither knows nor rejoices in its own welfare.’ If it is said that health cannot be felt, they absolutely deny it; for what man is in health, that does not perceive it when he is awake? Is there any man that is so dull and stupid as not to acknowledge that he feels a delight in health? And what is delight but another name for pleasure?
Read in contextUtopia · Thomas More (1478–1535) · OF THE TRAVELLING OF THE UTOPIANS
“But, of all pleasures, they esteem those to be most valuable that lie in the mind, the chief of which arise out of true virtue and the witness of a good conscience. They account health the chief pleasure that belongs to the body; for they think that the pleasure of eating and drinking, and all the other delights of sense, are only so far desirable as they give or maintain health; but they are not pleasant in themselves otherwise than as they resist those impressions that our natural infirmities are still making upon us. For as a wise man desires rather to avoid diseases than to take physic, and to be freed from pain rather than to find ease by remedies, so it is more desirable not to need this sort of pleasure than to be obliged to indulge it. If any man imagines that there is a real happiness in these enjoyments, he must then confess that he would be the happiest of all men if he were to lead his life in perpetual hunger, thirst, and itching, and, by consequence, in perpetual eating, drinking, and scratching himself; which any one may easily see would be not only a base, but a miserable, state of a life. These are, indeed, the lowest of pleasures, and the least pure, for we can never relish them but when they are mixed with the contrary pains. The pain of hunger must give us the pleasure of eating, and here the pain out-balances the pleasure. And as the pain is more vehement, so it lasts much longer; for as it begins before the pleasure, so it does not cease but with the pleasure that extinguishes it, and both expire together. They think, therefore, none of those pleasures are to be valued any further than as they are necessary; yet they rejoice in them, and with due gratitude acknowledge the tenderness of the great Author of Nature, who has planted in us appetites, by which those things that are necessary for our preservation are likewise made pleasant to us. For how miserable a thing would life be if those daily diseases of hunger and thirst were to be carried off by such bitter drugs as we must use for those diseases that return seldomer upon us! And thus these pleasant, as well as proper, gifts of Nature maintain the strength and the sprightliness of our bodies.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XX——OF THE FORCE OF IMAGINATION
Is there nothing but these veins and muscles that swell and flag without the consent, not only of the will, but even of our knowledge also? We do not command our hairs to stand on end, nor our skin to shiver either with fear or desire; the hands often convey themselves to parts to which we do not direct them; the tongue will be interdict, and the voice congealed, when we know not how to help it. When we have nothing to eat, and would willingly forbid it, the appetite does not, for all that, forbear to stir up the parts that are subject to it, no more nor less than the other appetite we were speaking of, and in like manner, as unseasonably leaves us, when it thinks fit. The vessels that serve to discharge the belly have their own proper dilatations and compressions, without and beyond our concurrence, as well as those which are destined to purge the reins; and that which, to justify the prerogative of the will, St. Augustine urges, of having seen a man who could command his rear to discharge as often together as he pleased, Vives, his commentator, yet further fortifies with another example in his time,—of one that could break wind in tune; but these cases do not suppose any more pure obedience in that part; for is anything commonly more tumultuary or indiscreet?
Read in contextDiscourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART V
From the description of inanimate bodies and plants, I passed to animals, and particularly to man. But since I had not as yet sufficient knowledge to enable me to treat of these in the same manner as of the rest, that is to say, by deducing effects from their causes, and by showing from what elements and in what manner nature must produce them, I remained satisfied with the supposition that God formed the body of man wholly like to one of ours, as well in the external shape of the members as in the internal conformation of the organs, of the same matter with that I had described, and at first placed in it no rational soul, nor any other principle, in room of the vegetative or sensitive soul, beyond kindling in the heart one of those fires without light, such as I had already described, and which I thought was not different from the heat in hay that has been heaped together before it is dry, or that which causes fermentation in new wines before they are run clear of the fruit. For, when I examined the kind of functions which might, as consequences of this supposition, exist in this body, I found precisely all those which may exist in us independently of all power of thinking, and consequently without being in any measure owing to the soul; in other words, to that part of us which is distinct from the body, and of which it has been said above that the nature distinctively consists in thinking, functions in which the animals void of reason may be said wholly to resemble us; but among which I could not discover any of those that, as dependent on thought alone, belong to us as men, while, on the other hand, I did afterwards discover these as soon as I supposed God to have created a rational soul, and to have annexed it to this body in a particular manner which I described.
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