Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
Besides this, I Consider that this Power of Imagination which is in me (as it differs from the Power of Understanding) does not appertain to the Essence of Me, that is, of my mind, for tho I wanted it, yet certainly I should be the same He, that now I am: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something different from my self; and I easily perceive that if any Body whatever did Exist, to which my Mind were so conjoyn’d, that it may Apply it self when it pleased to Consider, or (as it were) Look into this Body; From hence, I say, I perceive It may so be, that by this very Body I may Imagine Corporeal Beings: So that this Manner of Thinking differs from pure Intellection only in this, that the Mind, when it Understands, does as it were turn it self, to it self, or Reflect on it self, and beholds some or other of those Ideas which are in it self; But when it Imagines, it Converts it self upon Body, and therein beholds something Conformable to that Idea, which it hath understood, or perceived by Sense.
But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination May be so performed, supposing Body to Exist. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence I probably guess, that Body does Exist. But this I only say probably, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the distinct Idea of Body, which I find in my Imagination, yet I find none of them, from whence I may necessarily conclude, that Body does Exist. But I have been accustomed to Imagine many other things besides that Corporeal Nature which is the Object of pure Mathematicks; such as are, Colours, Sounds, Tasts, Pain, &c. but none of these so distinctly. And because I perceive these better by Sense, from Which by the Help of the Memory they come to the Imagination, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider Sence, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of Thought, which I call Sense, I can deduce any certain Argument for the Existence of Corporeal Beings. And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by Sence I have heretofore thought True, and the Reasons why I so thought: I will then enquire into the Reasons for which I afterwards doubted those things. And last of all I will consider what I ought to think of those Things at Present. The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses.
First therefore I have always thought that I have had an Head, Hands, Feet, and other Members, of which This Body (which I have look’d upon as a Part of Me, or Perhaps as my Whole self) Consists; And I have also thought that this Body of Mine is Conversant or engaged among many Other Bodies, by which it is Liable to be affected with what is advantagious or hurtful; What was Advantagious I judged by a certain sense of Pleasure, what was Hurtful by a sense of Pain. Furthermore, besides Pleasure and Pain, I perceived in my self Hunger, Thirst, and other such like Appetites, as also certain Corporeal Propensions to Mirth, Sadness, Anger, and other like Passions. As to What hapned to me from Bodies without, Besides the Extension, Figure, and Motion of those Bodies, I also perceived in them Hardness, Heat, and other tactile Qualities, as also Light, Colours, Smells, Tasts, Sounds, &c. and by the Variation of these I distinguish’d the Heaven, Earth, and Seas, and all other Bodies from each other.
Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these Ideas of Qualities, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I properly and Immediately perceived) that I thought my self to Perceive some Things Different from my Thought, viz. The Bodies or Objects from whence these Ideas might Proceed; for I often found these Ideas come upon me without my Consent or Will; so that I can neither perceive an Object (tho I had a mind to it) unless it were before the Organs of my Sense; Neither can I Hinder my self from perceiving it, when it is Present. And seeing that those Ideas which I take in by sense are much more Lively, Apparent and in their kind more distinct, than any of those which I knowingly and Willingly frame by Meditation, or stir up in my Memory; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from my self. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things Without Me. Of Which Things seeing I have no other Knowledge but from these Ideas, I cannot Think but that these Ideas are like the Things.
Moreover, Because I remember that I first made use of my senses before my Reason; and because I did perceive that those Ideas which I my self did frame were not so Manifest as those which I received by my senses, but very often made up of their parts, I was easily perswaded to think that I had no Idea in my Understanding, which I had not First in my sense.
Passages expressing a similar idea
A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · BOOK II OF THE PASSIONS / PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY / SECT. I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT
It is certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them would lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. For this reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions, which I have called secondary and reflective, as arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and considered by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception. A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not derived immediately from any affection or idea. The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the VIOLENT. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called PASSIONS, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguished from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and spacious division, that I may proceed with the greater order; and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas, shall now explain those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY
Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be allowed to be near enough connected with us to form one of these double relations, which I have asserted to be necessary to the causes of pride and humility. Wherever, therefore, we can find the other relation of impressions to join to this of ideas, we may expect with assurance either of these passions, according as the impression is pleasant or uneasy. But beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar delight and satisfaction; as deformity produces pain, upon whatever subject it may be placed, and whether surveyed in an animate or inanimate object. If the beauty or deformity, therefore, be placed upon our own bodies, this pleasure or uneasiness must be converted into pride or humility, as having in this case all the circumstances requisite to produce a perfect transition of impressions and ideas. These opposite sensations are related to the opposite passions. The beauty or deformity is closely related to self, the object of both these passions. No wonder, then our own beauty becomes an object of pride, and deformity of humility.
Read in contextThe Confessions of Jean Jacques Rousseau — Complete · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · BOOK IX.
The recollection of the different periods of my life led me to reflect upon that at which I was arrived, and I found I was already on the decline, a prey to painful disorders, and imagined I was approaching the end of my days without having, tasted, in all its plentitude, scarcely any one of the pleasures after which my heart had so much thirsted, or having given scope to the lively sentiments I felt it had in reserve. I had not favored even that intoxicating voluptuousness with which my mind was richly stored, and which, for want of an object, was always compressed, and never exhaled but by signs. How was it possible that, with a mind naturally expansive, I, with whom to live was to love, should not hitherto have found a friend entirely devoted to me; a real friend: I who felt myself so capable of being such a friend to another? How can it be accounted for that with such warm affections, such combustible senses, and a heart wholly made up of love, I had not once, at least, felt its flame for a determinate object? Tormented by the want of loving, without ever having been able to satisfy it, I perceived myself approaching the eve of old age, and hastening on to death without having lived. These melancholy but affecting recollections led me to others, which, although accompanied with regret, were not wholly unsatisfactory. I thought something I had not yet received was still due to me from destiny.
Read in contextDiscourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART V
From the description of inanimate bodies and plants, I passed to animals, and particularly to man. But since I had not as yet sufficient knowledge to enable me to treat of these in the same manner as of the rest, that is to say, by deducing effects from their causes, and by showing from what elements and in what manner nature must produce them, I remained satisfied with the supposition that God formed the body of man wholly like to one of ours, as well in the external shape of the members as in the internal conformation of the organs, of the same matter with that I had described, and at first placed in it no rational soul, nor any other principle, in room of the vegetative or sensitive soul, beyond kindling in the heart one of those fires without light, such as I had already described, and which I thought was not different from the heat in hay that has been heaped together before it is dry, or that which causes fermentation in new wines before they are run clear of the fruit. For, when I examined the kind of functions which might, as consequences of this supposition, exist in this body, I found precisely all those which may exist in us independently of all power of thinking, and consequently without being in any measure owing to the soul; in other words, to that part of us which is distinct from the body, and of which it has been said above that the nature distinctively consists in thinking, functions in which the animals void of reason may be said wholly to resemble us; but among which I could not discover any of those that, as dependent on thought alone, belong to us as men, while, on the other hand, I did afterwards discover these as soon as I supposed God to have created a rational soul, and to have annexed it to this body in a particular manner which I described.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY
We must now proceed to account for the passion of malice, which imitates the effects of hatred, as pity does those of love; and gives us a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others, without any offence or injury on their part. So little are men governed by reason in their sentiments and opinions, that they always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value. When the mind considers, or is accustomed to, any degree of perfection, whatever falls short of it, though really esteemable, has notwithstanding the same effect upon the passions; as what is defective and ill. This is an original quality of the soul, and similar to what we have every day experience of in our bodies. Let a man heat one hand and cool the other; the same water will, at the same time, seem both hot and cold, according to the disposition of the different organs. A small degree of any quality, succeeding a greater, produces the same sensation, as if less than it really is, and even sometimes as the opposite quality. Any gentle pain, that follows a violent one, seems as nothing, or rather becomes a pleasure; as on the other hand a violent pain, succeeding a gentle one, is doubly grievous and uneasy.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.
To confirm this we may observe, that there are three different kinds of impressions conveyed by the senses. The first are those of the figure, bulk, motion and solidity of bodies. The second those of colours, tastes, smells, sounds, heat and cold. The third are the pains and pleasures, that arise from the application of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our flesh with steel, and such like. Both philosophers and the vulgar suppose the first of these to have a distinct continued existence. The vulgar only regard the second as on the same footing. Both philosophers and the vulgar, again, esteem the third to be merely perceptions and consequently interrupted and dependent beings.
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