Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
In which search I find that I distinctly imagine Quantity, that which Philosophers commonly call continued, that is to say, the Extension of that Quantity or thing continued into Length, Breadth, and Thickness, I can count in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign Bigness, Figure, Position, and Local Motion, to which Local Motion I can assign Duration. Neither are only these Generals plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable particulars concerning the Shapes, Number, and Motion of These Bodies; The Truth whereof is so evident, and agreeable to my Nature, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have Learnt any thing that is new, as to have only remembred what I have known before, or only to have thought on those things which were in me before, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so diligently.
One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable Ideas of certain things, which tho perhaps they exist no where without Me, yet they cannot Be said to be Nothing; and tho they are Thought upon by me at my will and pleasure, yet they are not made by Me, but have their own True and Immutable Natures. As when, for example, * I Imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure Exists no where out of my Thoughts, nor ever will Exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is Immutable and Eternal, which is neither made by me, nor depends on my mind, as appears for that many properties may be demonstrated of this Triangle, viz. That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now clearly know whether I will or not, tho before I never thought on them, when I imagine a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this Idea of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of sense, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a Triangular Shape; for I can think of Innumerable other Figures, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my senses, and yet I can Demonstrate various properties of them, as well as of a Triangle, which certainly are all true, seeing I know them clearly, and therefore they are something, and not a meer Nothing, for ’tis Evident that what is true is something.
And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that what I clearly perceive, is True; And tho I had not demonstrated it, yet such is the Nature of my Mind, that I could not but give my Assent to what I so perceive, at least, as long as I so perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on sensible Objects) that I held those Truths for the most certain which I evidently perceived, such as are concerning Figures, Numbers, with other parts of Arithmetick, and Geometry, as also whatever relates to pure and abstracted Mathematicks. Now therefore, if from this alone, That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind, it follows, That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing, does Really belong to it; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the Existence of a God? Certainly I find the Idea of a God, or infinitely perfect Being, as naturally in me, as the Idea of any Figure, or Number; and I as clearly and distinctly understand that it appertains to his Nature Always to Be, as I know that what I can demonstrate of a Mathematical Figure or Number belongs to the Nature of that Figure or Number: so that, tho all things which I have Meditated upon these three or four days were not true, yet I may well be as certain of the Existence of a God, as I have hitherto been of Mathematical Truths.
Doubt. Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so evident, but looks rather like a sophism; for seeing I am used in all other things to Distinguish Existence from Essence, I can easily perswade my self that the Existence of God may be distinguish’d from his Essence, so that I may Imagine God not to Exist. Solution. But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the Existence of God can no more be seperated from his Essence, then the Equality of the Three Angles to two right ones can be seperated from the Essence of a Triangle, or then the Idea of a Mountain can be without the Idea of a valley; so that ’tis no less a Repugnancy to think of a God (that is, A Being infinitely perfect) who wants Existence (that is, who wants a Perfection) then to think of a Mountain, to which there is no Valley adjoyning. Doubt. But what if I cannot imagine God but as Existing, or a Mountain without a Vally? yet supposing me to think of a Mountain with a Vally, it does not from thence follow, that there Is a Mountain in the World; so supposing me to think of a God as Existing, yet does it not follow that God Really Exists. For my Thought imposes no necessity on Things, and as I may imagine a Winged Horse, tho no Horse has Wings, so I may imagine an existing God, tho no God exist.
Solution. ’Tis true the Sophism seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a Mountain but with a Vally, it does not from hence follow, that a Mountain or Vally do Exist, but this will follow, that whether a Mountain or a Vally do or do not Exist, yet they cannot be seperated: so from hence that I cannot think of God but as Existing, it follows that Existence is Inseperable from God, and therefore that he Really Exists; Not because my Thought does all this, or Imposes any necessity on any Thing, but contrarily, because the necessity of the thing it self (viz. of Gods Existence) Determines me to think thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a God without Existence (that is, A Being absolutely perfect without the Cheif Perfection) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either with or without Wings. Doubt. And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose God Existing, after I have supposed him endowed with all Perfections, seeing Existence is one of them; but that my First Position (viz. His Absolute Perfection) is not necessary. Thus, for example, ’tis not necessary for me to think all Quadrilateral Figures inscribed in a Circle; But supposing that I think so, I am then necessitated to Confess a Rhombe Inscribed therein, and yet this is evidently False.
Passages expressing a similar idea
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INNATE PRINCIPLES, BOTH SPECULATIVE AND PRACTICAL.
Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as anything can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles. And he that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For, though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a Being.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY. / SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE.
I shall here take occasion to propose a second observation concerning our demonstrative reasonings, which is suggested by the same subject of the mathematics. It is usual with mathematicians, to pretend, that those ideas, which are their objects, are of so refined and spiritual a nature, that they fall not under the conception of the fancy, but must be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul are alone capable. The same notion runs through most parts of philosophy, and is principally made use of to explain oar abstract ideas, and to shew how we can form an idea of a triangle, for instance, which shall neither be an isoceles nor scalenum, nor be confined to any particular length and proportion of sides. It is easy to see, why philosophers are so fond of this notion of some spiritual and refined perceptions; since by that means they cover many of their absurdities, and may refuse to submit to the decisions of clear ideas, by appealing to such as are obscure and uncertain. But to destroy this artifice, we need but reflect on that principle so oft insisted on, that all our ideas are copyed from our impressions. For from thence we may immediately conclude, that since all impressions are clear and precise, the ideas, which are copyed from them, must be of the same nature, and can never, but from our fault, contain any thing so dark and intricate. An idea is by its very nature weaker and fainter than an impression; but being in every other respect the same, cannot imply any very great mystery. If its weakness render it obscure, it is our business to remedy that defect, as much as possible, by keeping the idea steady and precise; and till we have done so, it is in vain to pretend to reasoning and philosophy.
Read in contextDiscourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART V
I would here willingly have proceeded to exhibit the whole chain of truths which I deduced from these primary but as with a view to this it would have been necessary now to treat of many questions in dispute among the earned, with whom I do not wish to be embroiled, I believe that it will be better for me to refrain from this exposition, and only mention in general what these truths are, that the more judicious may be able to determine whether a more special account of them would conduce to the public advantage. I have ever remained firm in my original resolution to suppose no other principle than that of which I have recently availed myself in demonstrating the existence of God and of the soul, and to accept as true nothing that did not appear to me more clear and certain than the demonstrations of the geometers had formerly appeared; and yet I venture to state that not only have I found means to satisfy myself in a short time on all the principal difficulties which are usually treated of in philosophy, but I have also observed certain laws established in nature by God in such a manner, and of which he has impressed on our minds such notions, that after we have reflected sufficiently upon these, we cannot doubt that they are accurately observed in all that exists or takes place in the world and farther, by considering the concatenation of these laws, it appears to me that I have discovered many truths more useful and more important than all I had before learned, or even had expected to learn.
Read in contextThe Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs
But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show that such a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred—if at all—from observation, it is by no means evident how the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this thought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple one; and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point, because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representation in my mind takes no account of its content in space, and is consequently simple.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF.
It is evident, that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions, concerning matter of fact; that is, concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities. It is also evident, that the idea, of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of any thing we would conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea. Thus when we affirm, that God is existent, we simply form the idea of such a being, as he is represented to us; nor is the existence, which we attribute to him, conceived by a particular idea, which we join to the idea of his other qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them. But I go farther; and not content with asserting, that the conception of the existence of any object is no addition to the simple conception of it, I likewise maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes. But as it is certain there is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and the belief of it, and as this difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, in which we conceive it.
Read in contextThe Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being
For, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely, the inference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the existence of an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable; that, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all reality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to be absolutely unconditioned; and admitting too, that we have thus discovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed, without inconsistency, absolute necessity—it does not follow from all this that the conception of a limited being, in which the supreme reality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not discover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a being—an element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions—I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where a certain condition does not exist (in the present, completeness, as far as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist either. On the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise unconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the general conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary being, and must be in every respect without result.
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