Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body
René Descartes (1596–1650)
In fine, such is the Excellence of these six Meditations, that I cannot resemble his Performance herein better than to the Six Days Work of the Supream Architect; and certainly next to the Creation of All things out of Nothing, the Restauration of Truth out of Errors is the most Divine Work; so that (with Reverence be it spoken) the Incomparable Des-Cartes does hereby deserve as it were the name of a Creatour. In the first Meditation we are Presented with a Rude and Indigested Chaos of Errours and Doubts, till the Divine spirit of the Noble Des-Cartes (pardon the Boldness of the Expression) moves upon the confused face of these Waters, and thereout produces some clear and distinct Light; by which Sun-shine he proceeds to bring forth and cherish other Branches of Truth; Till at last by a six Days Labour he Establishes this Fair Fabrick (as I may call it) of the Intellectual World on foundations that shall never be shaken. Then sitting down with rest and satisfaction he looks upon this his Off-spring and Pronounces it Good.
These Things Consider’d, I need not make any long Apologies for my undertaking a translation thereof; The excellency of the Original is sufficient to vindicate my endeavours to present the English World with a Copy, and he that shall blame my Intentions of Communicating the Methods of Truth to those that have only the English Tongue, may as well find fault with those English that propagate the Christian Religion among savage Indians, and translate the Scriptures into their Language, because they have not the English Tongue. To understand Latin is no (or at most a very small) part of Learning, and that which certainly every Cobler in Rome was once endow’d with; and therefore must there then be no translations out of Greek into Latin? I doubt not, but there are many Persons in our Nations, who tho wanting Latin, are notwithstanding very capable of the most abstracted speculations; the late disturbances of our Kingdomes occasion’d many Youths, who were then in a fair way of Instruction, to forsake their learning, and divert their intentions from Literature to Arms, and yet many of these have afterwards become Men of extraordinary nary abilities and qualifications for learning notwithstanding their deficiency in the Roman Tongue. And I see no Reason why it should not be the desire, and consequently the endeavour of every true English man, to make his language as universal as is now the French, into which the best Books in all sorts of Learning, both Poetry and Prose, are daily translated out of all languages, but especially out of Greek and Latine. Among which these Meditations are to be found, entituled, Les Meditations Metaphysiques De Rene Des Cartes touchant la Premiere Philosophie. This was translated out of the Authors Latine into French by Monsieur le D. D. L. N. S. The several Objections also, which were made by divers learned Persons against these Meditations, with the Authors Answers, were translated into French by M. B. L. R. And, I hope, no one will assert, that the French are more fit to receive those metaphysical Notions delivered herein than the English Nation.
But ’twas none of the smallest motives I had to this undertaking, that tho some famous English Authours have taken notice of the Arguments here produced (for the proof of a Deity drawn from the Idea we have of God in our Mind, &c.) Particularly the most excellent and learned Dr. Stillingfleet in the first Chapter of the third Book in his Origines Sacræ, who refers his Readers to a further search into these Meditations in the 400 page of that Discourse; as also the Reverend Dr. Henry More in his Antidote against Atheism, and more fully in his Appendix annex’d thereto, hath treated of our Authors demonstration; and yet nothing of the genuine original from whence they have borrowed all their Copies (tho some of them drawn in a larger size, yet I question whether so expressive) nothing of our Authors proper management hath ever appear’d in English. Those that assert these Arguments to have been long before thought upon by some of the Fathers, I shall refer to our Authors just vindication of himself in his several Answers to Objections made against these Discourses. And here I shall dismiss the Reader detaining him no longer from that satisfaction which he may reasonably expect from the perusal of the following Meditations; this Translation is dedicated to no one in particular, but is humbly submitted to the moderate censure of all candid Readers, by Their humble servant Will. Molyneux. Dublin Feb. 19. 1679/80.
Meditation 1. Of Things Doubtful. Meditat. 2. Of the Nature of Mans Mind, and that ’tis easier Proved to Be then our Body. Meditat. 3. Of God, and that there Is a God. Meditat. 4. Of Truth and Falshood. Meditat. 5. Of the Essence of Things Material, and herein again of God, and that He does Exist. Meditat. 6. Of Corporeal Beings and their Existence, as also of the Real Difference between Mind and Body. Objections and Answers. ERRATA. Pag. 1. line 8. dele off. p. 3. l. 21. there wants the sign of Interrogation. p. 8. l. 10. r. Premeditated. ib. l. 14. r. falshoods. p. 18. l. 15. r. that it may. p. 20. l. 11. r. suffers. In the two or three first chapters there are Astericks wanting. p. 33. l. 10. dele I. p. 39. l. 25. r. formally. p. 49. l. 14 r. Duration and Continuance. p. 54. l. 2 for the Point put a Comma. p. 61. l. ult. r. I enquire. p. 91. r. in the margin doubted. p. 124. l. 6. r. have no affinity. Transcriber’s Note: These errata have been corrected, along with some obvious typos. The spelling in this book is not only of its time, but also wildly variable, and has been left well alone.
Meditat. I. Of Things Doubtful. Some years past I perceived how many Falsities I admitted as Truths in my Younger years, and how Dubious those things were which I raised from thence; and therefore I thought it requisite (if I had a designe to establish any thing that should prove firme and permanent in sciences) that once in my life I should clearly cast aside all my former opinions, and begin a new from some First principles. But this seemed a great Task, and I still expected that maturity of years, then which none could be more apt to receive Learning; upon which Account I waited so long, that at last I should deservedly be blamed had I spent that time in Deliberation which remain’d only for Action. This day therefore I conveniently released my mind from all cares, I procured to my self a Time Quiet, and free from all Business, I retired my self Alone; and now at length will I freely and seriously apply my self to the General overthrow of all my former Opinions. To the Accomplishment of Which, it will not be necessary for me to prove them all false (for that perhaps I shall never atcheive) But because my reason perswades me, that I must withdraw my assent no less from those opinions which seem not so very certain and undoubted, then I should from those that are Apparently false, it will be sufficient if I reject all those wherein I find any Occasion of doubt.
Passages expressing a similar idea
Ethics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 3
APPENDIX: In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that he necessarily exists, that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature; that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived; lastly, that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion afforded, taken care to remove the prejudices, which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the concatenation of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.
This opinion is certainly very curious, and well worth our attention; but it will appear superfluous to examine it in this place, if we reflect a moment on our present purpose in taking notice of it. We have established it as a principle, that as all ideas are derived from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, it is impossible we can have any idea of power and efficacy, unless some instances can be produced, wherein this power is perceived to exert itself. Now, as these instances can never be discovered in body, the Cartesians, proceeding upon their principle of innate ideas, have had recourse to a supreme spirit or deity, whom they consider as the only active being in the universe, and as the immediate cause of every alteration in matter. But the principle of innate ideas being allowed to be false, it follows, that the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds. For if every idea be derived from an impression, the idea of a deity proceeds from the same origin; and if no impression, either of sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy, it is equally impossible to discover or even imagine any such active principle in the deity. Since these philosophers, therefore, have concluded, that matter cannot be endowed with any efficacious principle, because it is impossible to discover in it such a principle; the same course of reasoning should determine them to exclude it from the supreme being. Or if they esteem that opinion absurd and impious, as it really is, I shall tell them how they may avoid it; and that is, by concluding from the very first, that they have no adequate idea of power or efficacy in any object; since neither in body nor spirit, neither in superior nor inferior natures, are they able to discover one single instance of it.
Read in contextThe Works of Edgar Allan Poe — Volume 1 · Edgar Allan Poe (1809–1849) · THE MYSTERY OF MARIE ROGET.(*1) / A SEQUEL TO “THE MURDERS IN THE RUE MORGUE.”
[For reasons which we shall not specify, but which to many readers will appear obvious, we have taken the liberty of here omitting, from the MSS. placed in our hands, such portion as details the following up of the apparently slight clew obtained by Dupin. We feel it advisable only to state, in brief, that the result desired was brought to pass; and that the Prefect fulfilled punctually, although with reluctance, the terms of his compact with the Chevalier. Mr. Poe’s article concludes with the following words.—Eds. (*23)] It will be understood that I speak of coincidences and no more. What I have said above upon this topic must suffice. In my own heart there dwells no faith in præter-nature. That Nature and its God are two, no man who thinks, will deny. That the latter, creating the former, can, at will, control or modify it, is also unquestionable. I say “at will;” for the question is of will, and not, as the insanity of logic has assumed, of power. It is not that the Deity cannot modify his laws, but that we insult him in imagining a possible necessity for modification. In their origin these laws were fashioned to embrace all contingencies which could lie in the Future. With God all is Now.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XII. — APOLOGY FOR RAIMOND SEBOND.
The first thing they reprehend in his work is “That Christians are to blame to repose their belief upon human reason, which is only conceived by faith and the particular inspiration of divine grace.” In which objection there appears to be something of zeal to piety, and therefore we are to endeavour to satisfy those who put it forth with the greater mildness and respect. This were a task more proper for a man well read in divinity than for me, who know nothing of it; nevertheless, I conceive that in a thing so divine, so high, and so far transcending all human intelligence, as is that truth, with which it has pleased the bounty of God to enlighten us, it is very necessary that he should moreover lend us his assistance, as a very extraordinary favour and privilege, to conceive and imprint it in our understanding. And I do not believe that means purely human are in any sort capable of doing it: for, if they were, so many rare and excellent souls, and so abundantly furnished with natural force, in former ages, could not have failed, by their reason, to arrive at this knowledge. ‘Tis faith alone that livelily mind certainly comprehends the deep mysteries of our religion; but, withal, I do not say that it is not a worthy and very laudable attempt to accommodate those natural and human utensils with which God has endowed us to the service of our faith: it is not to be doubted but that it is the most noble use we can put them to; and that there is not a design in a Christian man more noble than to make it the aim and end of all his studies to extend and amplify the truth of his belief. We do not satisfy ourselves with serving God with our souls and understandings only, we moreover owe and render him a corporal reverence, and apply our limbs and motions, and external things to do him honour; we must here do the same, and accompany our faith with all the reason we have, but always with this reservation, not to fancy that it is upon us that it depends, nor that our arguments and endeavours can arrive at so supernatural and divine a knowledge. If it enters not into us by an extraordinary infusion; if it enters not only by reason, but, moreover, by human ways, it is not in us in its true dignity and splendour: and yet, I am afraid, we only have it by this way.
Read in contextEthics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 1
*****Note—Some assert that God, like a man, consists of body and mind, and is susceptible of passions. How far such persons have strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said. But these I pass over. For all who have in anywise reflected on the divine nature deny that God has a body. Of this they find excellent proof in the fact that we understand by body a definite quantity, so long, so broad, so deep, bounded by a certain shape, and it is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of God, a being absolutely infinite. But meanwhile by other reasons with which they try to prove their point, they show that they think corporeal or extended substance wholly apart from the divine nature, and say it was created by God. Wherefrom the divine nature can have been created, they are wholly ignorant; thus they clearly show that they do not know the meaning of their own words. I myself have proved sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judgment (Cor. Prop. vi., and Note 2, Prop. viii.), that no substance can be produced or created by anything other than itself. Further, I showed (in Prop. xiv.) that besides God no substance can be granted or conceived. Hence we drew the conclusion that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God. However, in order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my adversaries, which all start from the following points:—
Read in contextAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECTION XI. / OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE.
The religious philosophers, not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers, and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce), indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concourse of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire. I shall not examine the justness of this argument. I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire. It is sufficient, if I can prove, from this very reasoning, that the question is entirely speculative, and that, when, in my philosophical disquisitions, I deny a providence and a future state, I undermine not the foundations of society, but advance principles, which they themselves, upon their own topics, if they argue consistently, must allow to be solid and satisfactory.
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