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Six metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body

René Descartes (1596–1650)

And this, I suppose, is sufficient to make the Reader, not expect herein any smoothness of phrase or quaintness of Expression; what is here delivered in English is immediately taken, as it is naturally in the Original. The words, we hope, may be apposite enough, and fit to express what is here designed, and I think it a derogation from the Authors skill to draw the Picture of his mind in any other Colours, than what his own Copy expresses. Thus far in vindication of the Philosophical plain stile and rough Language of the following Translation. I shall add a line or two, first relating to the Readers, secondly of the Author, and lastly of the Meditations themselves, together with the Motives which excited me to this Work.

As to the Readers, ’tis, I suppose, so evident that candour of mind, and freedome from prejudice is requisite to all that desire to advantage themselves by reading other mens notions, that it need not be here insisted on with much earnestness; yet considering the Antiquity of this subject, and the novelty of the Arguments here produced, it seems to be more than ordinarily requisite for an impartial perusal of the ensuing Tract. Neither are the following Meditations to be slightly passed over, but with diligence and attention to be read; for as in mathematical demonstration, the careless missing of any one single Position may render the Conclusion obscure and sometimes inconsequent, so in these metaphysical Demonstrations, which (as, before has been noted from the illustrious Author thereof) for certainty do equal, if not excel Geometrical Propositions, the slight attention to any one particular Argument may frustrate the design of the whole discourse. The Reasoning therefore here being close and solid, and (as in Mathematicks) the knowledge of the latter depending on the knowledge of what went before, ’tis the duty of every Reader seriously to attend the Particulars, as also the connexion of the whole. Let him weigh the Arguments and perpend the Conclusions, and after a clear and distinct Knowledge, lett him pass his judgement.

And to this end I shall make it my request to every Reader, that he would not be content with a single perusal of the following Discourses, but that he would often repeat his reading them over; for by this means the force of those Arguments, which at first may by chance escape the most diligent and attentive Peruser, by a second or third Essay may offer themselves more fully to his Consideration. This was the desire of our Author in an other of his pieces, I mean his Principles of Philosophy, which I am sure do not require so strict an attention of mind, as these abstracted speculations; and therefore if it were his Request in that case, we may Reasonably think that ’twas no less his desire in this. When we come to speak of the Incomparable Author of these Meditations, we have reason to lament our own Ignorance, and to blame the Ingratitude of the Age wherein he lived, for not transmitting to Posterity more certain and ample Records of the Life and Conversation of this Excellent Philosopher, all that has been Written in this kind gives us only so much light into the Life of this Prodigious Man, as may make us wish for more; imparting which, I shall recommend the Readers to a further enquiry into the inward Thoughts, (largly discover’d in the Writings) of our Famous Author, of whose outward actions and condition we have so small knowledge.

Renatus Des-Cartes was born on the last day of March in the year 1596. at Tours, or at Castrum Eraldum a Town near Tours in France; He came of an Antient and Noble Family, being by Descent Lord of Perron, His Father was a Senator of his Country, and a Man of no mean estate, leaving to this his only Son by a second Wife between six and seven thousand pounds a year. He was Educated in his younger years according to the manner of his Country (and as he himself recommends in one of his Epistles, viz. Epist. 90. partis secundæ to One for the Instruction of his Son) in the Aristotelian principles of Philosophy, a whole course whereof he had run through at the Age of seventeen in the Schools of Flexia, or La Flesche a Town in the Province of Anjou, famous for the Colledge of Jesuites there establish’d by Henry the 4th. But to this he did not Continue long devoted, giving early testimonies of his dislike to the unsatisfactory Notions, and verbose emptiness of the Peripatetick Philosophy; He used therefore his utmost endeavours (as he himself testifies in his Dissertatio de Methodo) to get loose from those Chains and Fetters of Mind to which the weakness of his tender years had subjected him.

To this end he betook himself to a long course of Travel, that by the variety of Objects, which he was likely to meet with in his journeys, the memory of his past Notions might be blotted out; In his travel he applied himself much to the study of the Art Military, and Mathematicks; In the latter he has left the World large testimonies of his Excellence in his Book of Geometry; and in the former we have reason to believe him most expert, for He was personally present at some Sieges and Battles both in France and Germany, as particularly at the Siege of Rochel, of Gava near Genoa, of Breda, at the Battle of Prague, &c. so that we may conclude that he had a Genius fitted (according to the Motto of the noble Sir W. Raliegh) Tam Marti, quam Mercurio, For the Pike as well as Pen. And as the Glorious Roman Emperour became a Cæsar by his Book as well as Sword, by the Conquests of his mind as well as those of his arm; so our Famous Author was Ex Utroque Clarus.

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    I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary phænomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not what more we can require of our philosophy.

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  • Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences · René Descartes (1596–1650) · PART VI

    I am glad, by the way, to take this opportunity of requesting posterity never to believe on hearsay that anything has proceeded from me which has not been published by myself; and I am not at all astonished at the extravagances attributed to those ancient philosophers whose own writings we do not possess; whose thoughts, however, I do not on that account suppose to have been really absurd, seeing they were among the ablest men of their times, but only that these have been falsely represented to us. It is observable, accordingly, that scarcely in a single instance has any one of their disciples surpassed them; and I am quite sure that the most devoted of the present followers of Aristotle would think themselves happy if they had as much knowledge of nature as he possessed, were it even under the condition that they should never afterwards attain to higher. In this respect they are like the ivy which never strives to rise above the tree that sustains it, and which frequently even returns downwards when it has reached the top; for it seems to me that they also sink, in other words, render themselves less wise than they would be if they gave up study, who, not contented with knowing all that is intelligibly explained in their author, desire in addition to find in him the solution of many difficulties of which he says not a word, and never perhaps so much as thought.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · BOOK III OF MORALS / PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL / SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVED FROM REASON

    There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning that it may silence, without convincing an antagonist, and requires the same intense study to make us sensible of its force, that was at first requisite for its invention. When we leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and it is difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attained with difficulty. This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of reasoning, where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first propositions, and where we often lose sight of all the most received maxims, either of philosophy or common life. I am not, however, without hopes, that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as it advances; and that our reasonings concerning morals will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the UNDERSTANDING and the PASSIONS. Morality is a subject that interests us above all others: We fancy the peace of society to be at stake in every decision concerning it; and it is evident, that this concern must make our speculations appear more real and solid, than where the subject is, in a great measure, indifferent to us. What affects us, we conclude can never be a chimera; and as our passion is engaged on the one side or the other, we naturally think that the question lies within human comprehension; which, in other cases of this nature, we are apt to entertain some doubt of. Without this advantage I never should have ventured upon a third volume of such abstruse philosophy, in an age, wherein the greatest part of men seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject every thing that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended.

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    I should not obtrude my affairs so much on the notice of my readers if very particular inquiries had not been made by my townsmen concerning my mode of life, which some would call impertinent, though they do not appear to me at all impertinent, but, considering the circumstances, very natural and pertinent. Some have asked what I got to eat; if I did not feel lonesome; if I was not afraid; and the like. Others have been curious to learn what portion of my income I devoted to charitable purposes; and some, who have large families, how many poor children I maintained. I will therefore ask those of my readers who feel no particular interest in me to pardon me if I undertake to answer some of these questions in this book. In most books, the I, or first person, is omitted; in this it will be retained; that, in respect to egotism, is the main difference. We commonly do not remember that it is, after all, always the first person that is speaking. I should not talk so much about myself if there were anybody else whom I knew as well. Unfortunately, I am confined to this theme by the narrowness of my experience. Moreover, I, on my side, require of every writer, first or last, a simple and sincere account of his own life, and not merely what he has heard of other men’s lives; some such account as he would send to his kindred from a distant land; for if he has lived sincerely, it must have been in a distant land to me. Perhaps these pages are more particularly addressed to poor students. As for the rest of my readers, they will accept such portions as apply to them. I trust that none will stretch the seams in putting on the coat, for it may do good service to him whom it fits.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · BOOK.

    I am sensible, that these two cases of the strength and weakness of the mind will not comprehend all mankind, and that there are in England, in particular, many honest gentlemen, who being always employed in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day exposed to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. They do well to keep themselves in their present situation; and instead of refining them into philosophers, I wish we could communicate to our founders of systems, a share of this gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient, which they commonly stand much in need of, and which would serve to temper those fiery particles, of which they are composed. While a warm imagination is allowed to enter into philosophy, and hypotheses embraced merely for being specious and agreeable, we can never have any steady principles, nor any sentiments, which will suit with common practice and experience. But were these hypotheses once removed, we might hope to establish a system or set of opinions, which if not true (for that, perhaps, is too much to be hoped for) might at least be satisfactory to the human mind, and might stand the test of the most critical examination.

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  • A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · BOOK.

    Nor is it only proper we should in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical researches, notwithstanding our sceptical principles, but also that we should yield to that propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light, in which we survey them in any particular instant. It is easier to forbear all examination and enquiry, than to check ourselves in so natural a propensity, and guard against that assurance, which always arises from an exact and full survey of an object. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism, but even our modesty too; and make use of such terms as these, it is evident, it is certain, it is undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others; but I here enter a caveat against any Objections, which may be offered on that head; and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of my own judgment, which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a sceptic still less than any other.

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