Pascal's Pensées
Blaise Pascal (1623–1662)
[131] P. 97, l. 26. Those great spiritual efforts, etc.—On this, and the following fragment, see Montaigne, Essais, ii, 29. [132] P. 98, l. 3. Epaminondas.—Praised by Montaigne, Essais, ii, 36. See also iii, 1. [133] P. 98, l. 17. Plerumque gratæ principibus vices.—Horace, Odes, III, xxix, 13, cited by Montaigne, Essais, i, 42. Horace has divitibus instead of principibus. [134] P. 99, l. 4. Man is neither angel nor brute, etc.—Montaigne, Essais, iii, 13. [135] P. 99, l. 14. Ut sis contentus, etc.—A quotation from Seneca. See Montaigne, Essais, ii, 3. [136] P. 99, l. 21. Sen. 588.—Seneca, Letter to Lucilius, xv. Montaigne, Essais, iii, I. [137] P. 99, l. 23. Divin.—Cicero, De Divin., ii, 58. [138] P. 99, l. 25. Cic.—Cicero, Tusc, ii, 2. The quotation is inaccurate. Montaigne, Essais, ii, 12. [139] P. 99, l. 27. Senec.—Seneca, Epist., 106. [140] P. 99, l. 28. Id maxime, etc.—Cicero, De Off., i, 31. [141] P. 99, l. 29. Hos natura, etc.—Virgil, Georgics, ii, 20. [142] P. 99, l. 30. Paucis opus, etc.—Seneca, Epist., 106. [143] P. 100, l. 3. Mihi sic usus, etc.—Terence, Heaut., I, i, 28. [144] P. 100, l. 4. Rarum est, etc.—Quintilian, x, 7. [145] P. 100, l. 5. Tot circa, etc.—M. Seneca, Suasoriæ, i, 4. [146] P. 100, l. 6. Cic.—Cicero, Acad., i, 45. [147] P. 100, l. 7. Nec me pudet, etc.—Cicero, Tusc., i, 25. [148] P. 100, l. 8. Melius non incipiet.—The rest of the quotation is quam desinet. Seneca, Epist., 72.
[149] P. 100, l. 25. They win battles.—Montaigne, in his Essais, ii, 12, relates that the Portuguese were compelled to raise the siege of Tamly on account of the number of flies. [150] P. 100, l. 27. When it is said, etc.—By Descartes. [151] P. 102, l. 20. Arcesilaus.—A follower of Pyrrho, the sceptic. He lived in the third century before Christ. [152] P. 105, l. 20. Ecclesiastes.—Eccles. viii, 17. [153] P. 106, l. 16. The academicians.—Dogmatic sceptics, as opposed to sceptics who doubt their own doubt. [154] P. 107, l. 10. Ego vir videns.—Lamentations iii, I. [155] P. 108, l. 26. Evil is easy, etc.—The Pythagoreans considered the good as certain and finite, and evil as uncertain and infinite. Montaigne, Essais, i, 9. [156] P. 109, l. 7. Paulus Æmilius.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. Cicero, Tusc., v, 40. [157] P. 109, l. 30. Des Barreaux.—Author of a licentious love song. He was born in 1602, and died in 1673. Balzac call him "the new Bacchus." [158] P. 110, l. 16. For Port-Royal.—The letters, A. P. R., occur in several places, and are generally thought to indicate what will be afterwards treated in lectures or conferences at Port-Royal, the famous Cistercian abbey, situated about eighteen miles from Paris. Founded early in the thirteenth century, it acquired its greatest fame in its closing years. Louis XIV was induced to believe it heretical; and the monastery was finally demolished in 1711. Its downfall was no doubt brought about by the Jesuits.
[159] P. 113, l. 4. They all tend to this end.—Montaigne, Essais, i, 19. [160] P. 119, l. 15. Quod ergo, etc.—Acts xvii, 23. [161] P. 119, l. 26. Wicked demon.—Descartes had suggested the possibility of the existence of an evil genius to justify his method of universal doubt. See his First Meditation. The argument is quite Cartesian. [162] P. 122, l. 18. Deliciæ meæ, etc.—Proverbs viii, 31. [163] P. 122, l. 18. Effundam spiritum, etc.—Is. xliv, 3; Joel ii, 28. [164] P. 122, l. 19. Dii estis.—Ps. lxxxii, 6. [165] P. 122, l. 20. Omnis caro fænum.—Is. xl, 6. [166] P. 122, l. 20. Homo assimilatus, etc.—Ps. xlix, 20. [167] P. 124, l. 24. Sapientius est hominibus.—1 Cor. i, 25. [168] P. 125, l. 1. Of original sin.—The citations from the Rabbis in this fragment are borrowed from a work of the Middle Ages, entitled Pugio christianorum ad impiorum perfidiam jugulandam et maxime judæorum. It was written in the thirteenth century by Raymond Martin, a Catalonian monk. An edition of it appeared in 1651, edited by Bosquet, Bishop of Lodève. [169] P. 125, l. 24. Better is a poor and wise child, etc.—Eccles. iv, 13. [170] P. 126, l. 17. Nemo ante, etc.—See Ovid, Met., iii, 137, and Montaigne, Essais, i, 18. [171] P. 127, l. 10. Figmentum.—Borrowed from the Vulgate, Ps. ciii, 14. [172] P. 128. l. 5. All that is in the world, etc.—First Epistle of St. John, ii, 16.
[173] P. 128, l. 7. Wretched is, etc.—M. Faugère thinks this thought is taken from St. Augustine's Commentary on Ps. cxxxvii, Super flumina Babylonis. [174] P. 129, l. 6. Qui gloriatur, etc.—1 Cor. i, 31. [175] P. 130, l. 13. Via, veritas.—John xiv, 6. [176] P. 130, l. 14. Zeno.—The original founder of Stoicism. [177] P. 130, l. 15. Epictetus.—Diss., iv, 6, 7. [178] P. 131, l. 32. A body full of thinking members.—See I Cor. xii. [179] P. 133, l. 5. Book of Wisdom.—ii, 6. [180] P. 134, l. 28. Qui adhæret, etc.—1 Cor. vi, 17. [181] P. 134, l. 36. Two laws.—Matthew xxii, 35-40; Mark xii, 28-31. [182] P. 135, l. 6. The kingdom of God is within us.—Luke xvii, 29. [183] P. 137, l. 1. Et non, etc.—Ps. cxliii, 2. [184] P. 137, l. 3. The goodness of God leadeth to repentance.—Romans ii, 4. [185] P. 137, l. 5. Let us do penance, etc.—See Jonah iii, 8, 9. [186] P. 137, l. 27. I came to send war.—Matthew x, 34. [187] P. 137, l. 28. I came to bring fire and the sword.—Luke xii, 49. [188] P. 138, l. 2. Pharisee and the Publican.—Parable in Luke xviii, 9-14. [189] P. 138, l. 13. Abraham.—Genesis xiv, 22-24. [190] P. 138, l. 17. Sub te erit appetitus tuus.—Genesis iv, 7. [191] P. 140, l. 1. It is, etc.—A discussion on the Eucharist. [192] P. 140, l. 34. Non sum dignus.—Luke vii, 6. [193] P. 140, l. 35. Qui manducat indignus.—I Cor. xi, 29.
[194] P. 140, l. 36. Dignus est accipere.—Apoc. iv, II. [195] P. 141. In the French edition on which this translation is based there was inserted the following fragment after No. 513: "Work out your own salvation with fear." Proofs of prayer. Petenti dabitur. Therefore it is in our power to ask. On the other hand, there is God. So it is not in our power, since the obtaining of (the grace) to pray to Him is not in our power. For since salvation is not in us, and the obtaining of such grace is from Him, prayer is not in our power. The righteous man should then hope no more in God, for he ought not to hope, but to strive to obtain what he wants. Let us conclude then that, since man is now unrighteous since the first sin, and God is unwilling that he should thereby not be estranged from Him, it is only by a first effect that he is not estranged. Therefore, those who depart from God have not this first effect without which they are not estranged from God, and those who do not depart from God have this first effect. Therefore, those whom we have seen possessed for some time of grace by this first effect, cease to pray, for want of this first effect. Then God abandons the first in this sense.
Passages expressing a similar idea
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · David Hume (1711–1776) · FOOTNOTES.
This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosopher, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism. Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are still supposed infinitely divisible.
Read in contextThe Praise of Folly · Desiderius Erasmus (1469–1536) · Section 5
Add to this those their other determinations, and those too so contrary to common opinion that those oracles of the Stoics, which they call paradoxes, seem in comparison of these but blockish and idle—as 'tis a lesser crime to kill a thousand men than to set a stitch on a poor man's shoe on the Sabbath day; and that a man should rather choose that the whole world with all food and raiment, as they say, should perish, than tell a lie, though never so inconsiderable. And these most subtle subtleties are rendered yet more subtle by the several methods of so many Schoolmen, that one might sooner wind himself out of a labyrinth than the entanglements of the realists, nominalists, Thomists, Albertists, Occamists, Scotists. Nor have I named all the several sects, but only some of the chief; in all which there is so much doctrine and so much difficulty that I may well conceive the apostles, had they been to deal with these new kind of divines, had needed to have prayed in aid of some other spirit.
Read in contextEssays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER XXVI——THAT IT IS FOLLY TO MEASURE TRUTH AND ERROR BY OUR OWN CAPACITY
I presently pitied the poor people that were abused by these follies. Whereas I now find, that I myself was to be pitied as much, at least, as they; not that experience has taught me anything to alter my former opinions, though my curiosity has endeavoured that way; but reason has instructed me, that thus resolutely to condemn anything for false and impossible, is arrogantly and impiously to circumscribe and limit the will of God, and the power of our mother nature, within the bounds of my own capacity, than which no folly can be greater. If we give the names of monster and miracle to everything our reason cannot comprehend, how many are continually presented before our eyes? Let us but consider through what clouds, and as it were groping in the dark, our teachers lead us to the knowledge of most of the things about us; assuredly we shall find that it is rather custom than knowledge that takes away their strangeness— “Jam nemo, fessus saturusque videndi, Suspicere in coeli dignatur lucida templa;” [“Weary of the sight, now no one deigns to look up to heaven’s lucid temples.”—Lucretius, ii. 1037. The text has ‘statiate videnai’] and that if those things were now newly presented to us, we should think them as incredible, if not more, than any others. “Si nunc primum mortalibus adsint Ex improviso, si sint objecta repente, Nil magis his rebus poterat mirabile dici, Aute minus ante quod auderent fore credere gentes.” [Lucretius, ii. 1032. The sense of the passage is in the preceding sentence.]
Read in contextAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECTION XII. / OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.
There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
Read in contextAn Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2 · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
Some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose wilfully on himself, and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. Interest, though it does a great deal in the case, yet cannot be thought to work whole societies of men to so universal a perverseness, as that every one of them to a man should knowingly maintain falsehood: some at least must be allowed to do what all pretend to, i.e. to pursue truth sincerely; and therefore there must be something that blinds their understandings, and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for real truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense, will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of: some independent ideas, of no alliance to one another, are, by education, custom, and the constant din of their party, so coupled in their minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one idea, and they operate as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon, demonstration to absurdities, and consistency to nonsense, and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the errors in the world; or, if it does not reach so far, it is at least the most dangerous one, since, so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined, appear to the sight constantly united; if the eye sees these things riveted which are loose, where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to substitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error; and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their heads with false views, and their reasonings with false consequences.
Read in contextThe Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature · William James (1842–1910) · Index.
described by negatives, 417; his attributes, scholastic proof of, 439; the metaphysical ones are for us meaningless, 445; the moral ones are ill-deduced, 447; he is not a mere inference, 502; is used, not known, 506; his existence must make a difference among phenomena, 517, 522; his relation to the subconscious region, 242, 515; his tasks, 519; may be finite and plural, 525. Goddard, 96. Goerres, 407. Goethe, 137. Gough, 203. Gourdon, 171. “Grace,” the operation of, 226; the state of, 260. Gratry, 146, 476, 506. Greeks, their pessimism, 86, 142. Guidance, 472. Gurney, 527. Guyon, 276, 286. Hadley, 201, 268. Hale, 82. Hamon, 367. Happiness, 47-49, 79, 248, 279. Harnack, 100. Healthy-mindedness, Lectures IV and V, passim; its philosophy of evil, 131; compared with morbid-mindedness, 162, 488. Heart, softening of, 267. Hegel, 389, 449, 454. Helmont, Van, 497. Heroism, 364, 488, note. Heterogeneous personality, 169, 193. Higher criticism, 4. Hilty, 79, 275, 472. Hodgson, R., 524. Homer, 86. Hugo, 171. Hypocrisy, 338. Hypothesis, what make a useful one, 517. Hyslop, 524. Ignatius Loyola, 313, 406, 410. Illness, 113. “Imitation of Christ,” the, 44. Immortality, 524. Impulses, 261. Individuality, 501. Inhibitions, 261 ff. Insane melancholy and religion, 144. Insanity and genius, 16; and happiness, 279. Institutional religion, 335. Intellect a secondary force in religion, 431, 514. Intellectual weakness of some saints, 370. Intolerance, 342. Irascibility, 264. Jesus, Harnack on, 100. Job, 76, 448. John, Saint, of the Cross, 304, 407, 413. Johnston, 258. Jonquil, 476. Jordan, 347. Jouffroy, 176, 198. Judgments, existential and spiritual, 4. Kant, 54, 448. Karma, 522.
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