Politics: A Treatise on Government
Aristotle (-384–-322)
but what is practical, n Legislators should fix a proper medium in property, 46 Liberty, wherein it partly consists, 184, 185 Life, happy, owing to a course of virtue, 125; how divided, 228 Locrians forbid men to sell their property, 43 Lycophron's account of law, 82 Lycurgus gave over reducing the women to obedience, 53; made it infamous for any one to sell his possessions, 53; some of his laws censured, 54; spent much time at Crete, 57; supposed to be the scholar of Thales, 64 Lysander wanted to abolish the kingly power in Sparta, 143 Magistrate, to whom that name is properly given, 136 Magistrates, when they make the state incline to an oligarchy, 61; when to an aristocracy, 61; at Athens, from whom to be chosen, 64; to determine those causes which the law cannot be applied to, 88; whether their power is to be the same, or different in different communities, 137; how they differ from each other, 138; in those who appoint them, 138; should be continued but a short time in democracies, 161; how to be chosen in a democracy, 185; different sorts and employments, 196 Making and using, their difference, 6 Malienses, their form of government, 131 Man proved to be a political animal, 4; has alone a perception of good and evil, 4; without law and justice the worst of beings, 5 Master, power of, whence it arises, as some think, 5 Matrimony, when to be engaged in, 232 Meals, common, established in Crete and Italy, 218; expense of, should be defrayed by
the whole state, 219 Mechanic employments useful for citizens, 73 Mechanics, whether they should be allowed to be citizens, 74, 75; cannot acquire the practice of virtue, 75; admitted to be citizens in an oligarchy, 75 Medium of circumstances best, 126 Members of the community, their different pretences to the employments of the state, 90; what natural dispositions they ought to be of, 213 Men, some distinguished by nature for governors, others to be governed, 7; their different modes of living, 13; worthy three ways, 226 Merchandise, three different ways of carrying it on, 20 Middle rank of men make the best citizens, 127; most conducive to the preservation of the state, 128; should be particularly attended to by the legislators, 130 Military, how divided, 194 Mitylene, an account of a dispute there, 150 Monarch, absolute, 100 Monarchies, their nature, 95, 96; sometimes elective, 95; sometimes hereditary, 95; whence they sometimes arise, 146; causes of corruption in them, 167; how preserved, 173 Money, how it made its way into commerce, 16; first weighed, 16; afterwards stamped, 16; its value dependent on agreement, 16; how gained by exchange, 19 Money—getting considered at large, 17, 18 Monopolising gainful, 21; sometimes practised by cities, 21 Monopoly of iron in Sicily, a remarkable instance of the profit of it, 21 Music, how many species of it, in; why a part of education, 240; how far it should be taught, 242, 243; professors of it considered as mean people, 244; imitates the disposition of the mind, 246; improves our manners, 246; Lydian, softens the mind,
247; pieces of, difficult in their execution, not to be taught to children, 249 Nature requires equality amongst equals, 101 Naval power should be regulated by the strength of the city, 212 Necessary parts of a city, what, 215 Nobles, the difference between them, no; should take care of the poor, 193 Oath, an improper one in an oligarchy, 166 Officers of state, who they ought to be, 135; how long to continue, 135; who to choose them, 136 Offices, distinction between them, 67; when subversive of the rights of the people, 130 Offspring, an instance of the likeness of, to the sire, 30 Oligarchies arise where the strength of the state consists in horse, no; whence they arose, 142 Oligarchy admits not hired servants to be citizens, 75; its object, 79; what, 79, 81; its definition, 112; different sorts of, 117, 119; its object, 122; how it ought to be founded, 195 Onomacritus supposed to have drawn up laws, 64 Ostracism, why established, 93, 146; its power, 93; a weapon in the hand of sedition, 94 Painting, why it should be made a part of education, 241 Particulars, five, in which the rights of the people will be undermined, 130 Pausanias wanted to abolish the ephori, 143 People, how they should be made one, 35; of Athens assume upon their victory over the Medes, 64; what best to submit to a kingly government, 104; to an aristocratic, 104; to a free state, 104; should be allowed the power of pardoning, not of condemning, 135 Periander's advice to Thrasy-bulus, 93,
169 Pericles introduces the paying of those who attended the court of justice, 64 Philolaus, a Theban legislator, quits his native country, 64 Phocea, an account of a dispute there, 150 Physician, his business, 86 Physicians, their mode of practice in Egypt, 98; when ill consult others, 102 Pittacus, 65 Plato censured, 180 Poor excused from bearing arms and from gymnastic exercises in an oligarchy, 131; paid for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131 Power of the master, its object, 77 Power, supreme, where it ought to be lodged, 84; why with the many, 85, 87 Powers of a state, different methods of delegating them to the citizens, 132-134 Preadvisers, court of, 135 Priesthood, to whom to be allotted, 217 Prisoners of war, whether they may be justly made slaves, 9 Private property not regulated the source of sedition, 42; Phaleas would have it equal, 42; how Phaleas would correct the irregularities of it, 43; Plato would allow a certain difference in it, 43 Property, its nature, 12; how it should be regulated, 32, 33; the advantages of having it private, 34; what quantity the public ought to have, 44; ought not to be common, 219 Public assemblies, when subversive of the liberties of the people, 130 Public money, how to be divided, 193 Qualifications necessary for those who are to fill the first departments in government, 164 Quality of a city, what meant by it, 129 Quantity, 129 Rest and peace the proper objects of the legislator, 230 Revolutions in a democracy, whence they arise, 152; in
an oligarchy, 156 Rich fined in an oligarchy for not bearing arms and attending the gymnastic exercises, 131; receive nothing for attending the public assemblies in a democracy, 131 Rights of a citizen, whether advantageous or not, 203 Seditions sometimes prevented by equality, 45; their causes, 144-146; how to be prevented, 163 Senate suits a democracy, 185 Shepherds compose the second-best democracy, 189 Slave, his nature and use, 6; a chattel, 7; by law, how, 9 Slavery not founded in nature but law, as some think, 6 Slaves, an inquiry into the virtues they are capable of, 23; difficult to manage properly, 51; their different sorts, 73 Society necessary to man, 77 Society, civil, the greatest blessing to man, 4; different from a commercial intercourse, 82 Socrates, his mistakes on government, Book II.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Republic · Plato (-428–-348) · BOOK VIII
Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have already described. We have. Then let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or pure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether we ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions of the argument to prefer justice. Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say. Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honour?—I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at a satisfactory decision. That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · Subjects Are To Be Taught, Not To Affect Change Of Government
And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change. For the prosperity of a People ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly, commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, but from the Obedience, and Concord of the Subjects; nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him. Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and consequently the Concord of the People,) and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time be dissolved. And they that go about by disobedience, to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find they do thereby destroy it; like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of Medea, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but made not of him a new man. This desire of change, is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: For there God says, Non Habebis Deos Alienos; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations; and in another place concerning Kings, that they are Gods.
Read in contextLeviathan · Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) · That Not Men, But Law Governs
And therefore this is another Errour of Aristotles Politiques, that in a wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men should govern, but the Laws. What man, that has his naturall Senses, though he can neither write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and beleeves can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? or that beleeves the Law can hurt him; that is, Words, and Paper, without the Hands, and Swords of men? And this is of the number of pernicious Errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their Governours, to adhaere to those that call them Tyrants, and to think it lawfull to raise warre against them: And yet they are many times cherished from the Pulpit, by the Clergy.
Read in contextSecond Treatise of Government · John Locke (1632–1704) · CHAPTER. VII. / OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY.
Sect. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety. Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.
Read in contextAn Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations · Adam Smith (1723–1790) · PART III. Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.
The masters who instructed the young people, either in music or in military exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state, either in Rome or even at Athens, the Greek republic of whose laws and customs we are the best informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit himself for defending it in war, and should upon that account, learn his military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such masters as he could find; and it seems to have advanced nothing for this purpose, but a public field or place of exercise, in which he should practise and perform them. In the early ages, both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of education seem to have consisted in learning to read, write, and account, according to the arithmetic of the times. These accomplishments the richer citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home, by the assistance of some domestic pedagogue, who was, generally, either a slave or a freedman; and the poorer citizens in the schools of such masters as made a trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, however, were abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining those parents who had neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business.
Read in contextThe Republic · Plato (-428–-348) · BOOK I
And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?
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