The Critique of Pure Reason
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)
I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions “à priori”. III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge “à priori” IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements. V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements “à priori” are contained as Principles. VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason. VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason. § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time. § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions. § 8. Elucidation. § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic. § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic. I. Of Logic in General II. Of Transcendental Logic III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic Introductory § 3 Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. § 4 Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements. § 5 Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories. § 6
Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general § 9 Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. § 10 Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the Understanding. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations given by Sense. § 11. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12 The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13 What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14 The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15 All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness. § 16 Observation. § 17 In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only legitimate use of the Category. § 18 Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. § 20 Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22 Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. § 23 Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements. Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements. Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding. I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance. II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.
Section I—Of Ideas in General. Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas. Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas. I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe. II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Whole given in Intuition. III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes. IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences. Section I. Of the Ideal in General. Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale). Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being. Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God. Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God. Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof. Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason. Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism. Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics. Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis. Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs. Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason. Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason. Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic. Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba:
Passages expressing a similar idea
A Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING / PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC. / SECT. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.
Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general, that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and ideas are causes, and which effects. The full examination of this question is the subject of the present treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE CORRESPONDENT TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION.
When any object is presented to us, it immediately conveys to the mind a lively idea of that object, which is usually found to attend it; and this determination of the mind forms the necessary connexion of these objects. But when we change the point of view, from the objects to the perceptions; in that case the impression is to be considered as the cause, and the lively idea as the effect; and their necessary connexion is that new determination, which we feel to pass from the idea of the one to that of the other. The uniting principle among our internal perceptions is as unintelligible as that among external objects, and is not known to us any other way than by experience. Now the nature and effects of experience have been already sufficiently examined and explained. It never gives us any insight into the internal structure or operating principle of objects, but only accustoms the mind to pass from one to another.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.
But though this conclusion from the coherence of appearances may seem to be of the same nature with our reasonings concerning causes and effects; as being derived from custom, and regulated by past experience; we shall find upon examination, that they are at the bottom considerably different from each other, and that this inference arises from the understanding, and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner. For it will readily be allowed, that since nothing is ever really present to the mind, besides its own perceptions, it is not only impossible, that any habit should ever be acquired otherwise than by the regular succession of these perceptions, but also that any habit should ever exceed that degree of regularity. Any degree, therefore, of regularity in our perceptions, can never be a foundation for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects, which are not perceived; since this supposes a contradiction, viz. a habit acquired by what was never present to the mind. But it is evident, that whenever we infer the continued existence of the objects of sense from their coherence, and the frequency of their union, it is in order to bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observed in our mere perceptions. We remark a connexion betwixt two kinds of objects in their past appearance to the senses, but are not able to observe this connexion to be perfectly constant, since the turning about of our head or the shutting of our eyes is able to break it. What then do we suppose in this case, but that these objects still continue their usual connexion, notwithstanding their apparent interruption, and that the irregular appearances are joined by something, of which we are insensible? But as all reasoning concerning matters of fact arises only from custom, and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions, the extending of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.
As to the first part of the proposition, that this philosophical hypothesis has no primary recommendation, either to reason, or the imagination, we may soon satisfy ourselves with regard to reason by the following reflections. The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions. The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other. The idea of this relation is derived from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoined together, and are always present at once to the mind. But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions and objects. It is impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any of the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.
If our senses, therefore, suggest any idea of distinct existences, they must convey the impressions as those very existences, by a kind of fallacy and illusion. Upon this bead we may observe, that all sensations are felt by the mind, such as they really are, and that when we doubt, whether they present themselves as distinct objects, or as mere impressions, the difficulty is not concerning their nature, but concerning their relations and situation. Now if the senses presented our impressions as external to, and independent of ourselves, both the objects and ourselves must be obvious to our senses, otherwise they could not be compared by these faculties. The difficulty, then, is how fax we are ourselves the objects of our senses. It is certain there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person. So far from being able by our senses merely to determine this question, we must have recourse to the most profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it; and in common life it is evident these ideas of self and person are never very fixed nor determinate. It is absurd, therefore, to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and external objects.
Read in contextA Treatise of Human Nature · David Hume (1711–1776) · SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.
It will not now be necessary to prove, that those perceptions, which are simple, and exist no where, are incapable of any conjunction in place with matter or body, which is extended and divisible; since it is impossible to found a relation but on some common quality. It may be better worth our while to remark, that this question of the local conjunction of objects does not only occur in metaphysical disputes concerning the nature of the soul, but that even in common life we have every moment occasion to examine it. Thus supposing we consider a fig at one end of the table, and an olive at the other, it is evident, that in forming the complex ideas of these substances, one of the most obvious is that of their different relishes; and it is as evident, that we incorporate and conjoin these qualities with such as are coloured and tangible. The bitter taste of the one, and sweet of the other are supposed to lie in the very visible body, and to be separated from each other by the whole length of the table. This is so notable and so natural an illusion, that it may be proper to consider the principles, from which it is derived.
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