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Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592)

as well as other virtues Valour whetted and enraged by mischance Valour will cause a trembling in the limbs as well as fear Valuing the interest of discipline Vast distinction betwixt devotion and conscience Venture it upon his neighbour, if he will let him venture the making ourselves better without any danger Very idea we invent for their chastity is ridiculous Vice of confining their belief to their own capacity Vices will cling together, if a man have not a care Victorious envied the conquered Virtue and ambition, unfortunately, seldom lodge together Virtue is a pleasant and gay quality Virtue is much strengthened by combats Virtue refuses facility for a companion Viscid melting kisses of youthful ardour in my wanton age Voice and determination of the rabble, the mother of ignorance Vulgar reports and opinions that drive us on We are masters of nothing but the will We are not to judge of counsels by events We ask most when we bring least We believe we do not believe We can never be despised according to our full desert We cannot be bound beyond what we are able to perform We confess our ignorance in many things We consider our death as a very great thing We do not correct the man we hang; we correct others by him We do not easily accept the medicine we understand We do not go, we are driven We do not so much forsake vices as we change them We have lived enough for others We have more curiosity than capacity We have

naturally a fear of pain, but not of death We have not the thousandth part of ancient writings We have taught the ladies to blush We much more aptly imagine an artisan upon his close-stool We must learn to suffer what we cannot evade We neither see far forward nor far backward We only labour to stuff the memory We ought to grant free passage to diseases We say a good marriage because no one says to the contrary We set too much value upon ourselves We still carry our fetters along with us We take other men’s knowledge and opinions upon trust Weakness and instability of a private and particular fancy Weigh, as wise: men should, the burden of obligation Well, and what if it had been death itself?

Were more ambitious of a great reputation than of a good one What a man says should be what he thinks What are become of all our brave philosophical precepts? What can they not do, what do they fear to do (for beauty) What can they suffer who do not fear to die? What did I say? that I have? no, Chremes, I had What he did by nature and accident, he cannot do by design What is more accidental than reputation? What may be done to-morrow, may be done to-day What more? they lie with their lovers learnedly What need have they of anything but to live beloved and honoured What sort of wine he liked the best: “That of another” What step ends the near and what step begins the remote What they ought to do when they come to be men What we have not seen, we are forced to receive from other hands What, shall so much knowledge be lost Whatever was not ordinary diet, was instead of a drug When I travel I have nothing to care for but myself When jealousy seizes these poor souls When their eyes give the lie to their tongue When time begins to wear things out of memory When we have got it, we want something else “When will this man be wise,” said he, “if he is yet learning?”

When you see me moved first, let me alone, right or wrong Where the lion’s skin is too short Where their profit is, let them there have their pleasure too Wherever the mind is perplexed, it is in an entire disorder Whilst thou wast silent, thou seemedst to be some great thing Whimpering is offensive to the living and vain to the dead Who by their fondness of some fine sounding word Who can flee from himself Who discern no riches but in pomp and show Who does not boast of some rare recipe Who escapes being talked of at the same rate Who ever saw one physician approve of another’s prescription Who has once been a very fool, will never after be very wise Who would weigh him without the honour and grandeur of his end Whoever expects punishment already suffers it Whoever will be cured of ignorance must confess it Whoever will call to mind the excess of his past anger Whosoever despises his own life, is always master Why do we not imitate the Roman architecture?

Wide of the mark in judging of their own works Willingly give them leave to laugh after we are dead Willingly slip the collar of command upon any pretence whatever Wisdom has its excesses, and has no less need of moderation Wisdom is folly that does not accommodate itself to the common Wise man lives as long as he ought, not so long as he can Wise man never loses anything if he have himself Wise man to keep a curbing hand upon the impetus of friendship Wise may learn more of fools, than fools can of the wise Wise whose invested money is visible in beautiful villas Wiser who only know what is needful for them to know With being too well I am about to die Woman who goes to bed to a man, must put off her modesty Women who paint, pounce, and plaster up their ruins Wont to give others their life, and not to receive it World where loyalty of one’s own children is unknown Worse endure an ill-contrived robe than an ill-contrived mind Would have every one in his party blind or a blockhead Would in this affair have a man a little play the servant Wrangling arrogance, wholly believing and trusting in itself Wretched and dangerous thing to depend upon others Write what he knows, and as much as he knows, but no more Wrong the just side when they go about to assist it with fraud Yet at least for ambition’s sake, let us reject ambition Yet do we find any end of the need of interpretating?

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  • A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

    AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED.—When a man holds his proper station in life, he does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I desire and avoid conformably to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an object as I am by nature formed to do, and purpose and design and assent. Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed a spit? My wish has always been that those who meet me should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim, O the great philosopher! Who are they by whom you wish to be admired? Are they not those of whom you are used to say that they are mad? Well, then, do you wish to be admired by madmen?

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  • Essays — First Series · Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) · IV. SPIRITUAL LAWS / SPIRITUAL LAWS

    We like only such actions as have already long had the praise of men, and do not perceive that any thing man can do may be divinely done. We think greatness entailed or organized in some places or duties, in certain offices or occasions, and do not see that Paganini can extract rapture from a catgut, and Eulenstein from a jews-harp, and a nimble-fingered lad out of shreds of paper with his scissors, and Landseer out of swine, and the hero out of the pitiful habitation and company in which he was hidden. What we call obscure condition or vulgar society is that condition and society whose poetry is not yet written, but which you shall presently make as enviable and renowned as any. In our estimates let us take a lesson from kings. The parts of hospitality, the connection of families, the impressiveness of death, and a thousand other things, royalty makes its own estimate of, and a royal mind will. To make habitually a new estimate,—that is elevation. What a man does, that he has. What has he to do with hope or fear? In himself is his might. Let him regard no good as solid but that which is in his nature and which must grow out of him as long as he exists. The goods of fortune may come and go like summer leaves; let him scatter them on every wind as the momentary signs of his infinite productiveness.

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER X. AGAINST RASH JUDGMENT.

    It is a madness to be disordered at these fooleries; we consider the thing done, and not the doer of it. “It may be he did it unwillingly, or by chance. It was a trick put upon him, or he was forced to it. He did it for reward perhaps, not hatred; nor of his own accord, but he was urged on to it.” Nay, some regard must be had to the age of the person, or to fortune; and we must consult humanity and candor in the case. One does me a great mischief at unawares; another does me a very small one by design, or peradventure none at all, but intended me one. The latter was more in fault, but I will be angry with neither. We must distinguish betwixt what a man cannot do and what he will not. “It is true he has once offended me; but how often has he pleased me! He has offended me often, and in other kinds; and why should not I bear it as well now as I have done?” Is he my friend? why then, “It was against his will.” Is he my enemy? It is “no more than I looked for.” Let us give way to wise men, and not squabble with fools; and say thus to ourselves, “We have all of us our errors.” No man is so circumspect, so considerate, or so fearful of offending, but he has much to answer for.

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  • A Selection from the Discourses of Epictetus with the Encheiridion · Epictetus (55–135) · A SELECTION FROM THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS.

    THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL.—Where is the good? In the will. Where is the evil? In the will. Where is neither of them? In those things which are independent of the will. Well then? Does any one among us think of these lessons out of the schools? Does any one meditate (strive) by himself to give an answer to things as in the case of questions?—Is it day?—Yes.—Is it night?—No.—Well, is the number of stars even?—I cannot say.—When money is shown (offered) to you, have you studied to make the proper answer, that money is not a good thing? Have you practised yourself in these answers, or only against sophisms? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which you have studied, in those you have improved; but in those which you have not studied, in those you remain the same? When the rhetorician knows that he has written well, that he has committed to memory what he has written, and brings an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious? Because he is not satisfied with having studied. What then does he want? To be praised by the audience? For the purpose then of being able to practise declamation he has been disciplined; but with respect to praise and blame he has not been disciplined. For when did he hear from any one what praise is, what blame is, what the nature of each is, what kind of praise should be sought, or what kind of blame should be shunned? And when did he practise this discipline which follows these words (things)? Why then do you still wonder, if in the matters which a man has learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in which he has not been disciplined, there he is the same with the many. So the lute player knows how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and yet he trembles when he enters on the stage; for these matters he understands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a crowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what anxiety is, whether it is our work or the work of another, whether it is possible to stop it or not. For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves the theatre puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, the swollen bladder has been punctured and subsides.

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  • Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None · Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) · LIII. THE RETURN HOME.

    Disguised did I sit amongst them, ready to misjudge MYSELF that I might endure THEM, and willingly saying to myself: “Thou fool, thou dost not know men!” One unlearneth men when one liveth amongst them: there is too much foreground in all men—what can far-seeing, far-longing eyes do THERE! And, fool that I was, when they misjudged me, I indulged them on that account more than myself, being habitually hard on myself, and often even taking revenge on myself for the indulgence. Stung all over by poisonous flies, and hollowed like the stone by many drops of wickedness: thus did I sit among them, and still said to myself: “Innocent is everything petty of its pettiness!” Especially did I find those who call themselves “the good,” the most poisonous flies; they sting in all innocence, they lie in all innocence; how COULD they—be just towards me! He who liveth amongst the good—pity teacheth him to lie. Pity maketh stifling air for all free souls. For the stupidity of the good is unfathomable. To conceal myself and my riches—THAT did I learn down there: for every one did I still find poor in spirit. It was the lie of my pity, that I knew in every one, —That I saw and scented in every one, what was ENOUGH of spirit for him, and what was TOO MUCH! Their stiff wise men: I call them wise, not stiff—thus did I learn to slur over words.

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  • Emile · Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) · THE CREED OF A SAVOYARD PRIEST

    How often in the course of my inquiries have I grown weary of my own coldness of heart! How often have grief and weariness poured their poison into my first meditations and made them hateful to me! My barren heart yielded nothing but a feeble zeal and a lukewarm love of truth. I said to myself: Why should I strive to find what does not exist? Moral good is a dream, the pleasures of sense are the only real good. When once we have lost the taste for the pleasures of the soul, how hard it is to recover it! How much more difficult to acquire it if we have never possessed it! If there were any man so wretched as never to have done anything all his life long which he could remember with pleasure, and which would make him glad to have lived, that man would be incapable of self-knowledge, and for want of knowledge of goodness, of which his nature is capable, he would be constrained to remain in his wickedness and would be for ever miserable. But do you think there is any one man upon earth so depraved that he has never yielded to the temptation of well-doing? This temptation is so natural, so pleasant, that it is impossible always to resist it; and the thought of the pleasure it has once afforded is enough to recall it constantly to our memory. Unluckily it is hard at first to find satisfaction for it; we have any number of reasons for refusing to follow the inclinations of our heart; prudence, so called, restricts the heart within the limits of the self; a thousand efforts are needed to break these bonds. The joy of well-doing is the prize of having done well, and we must deserve the prize before we win it. There is nothing sweeter than virtue; but we do not know this till we have tried it. Like Proteus in the fable, she first assumes a thousand terrible shapes when we would embrace her, and only shows her true self to those who refuse to let her go.

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