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Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete

Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592)

whenever we please, cut short inconveniences Death conduces more to birth and augmentation than to loss Death discharges us of all our obligations Death has us every moment by the throat Death is a part of you Death is terrible to Cicero, coveted by Cato Death of old age the most rare and very seldom seen Deceit maintains and supplies most men’s employment Decree that says, “The court understands nothing of the matter” Defence allures attempt, and defiance provokes an enemy Defend most the defects with which we are most tainted Defer my revenge to another and better time Deformity of the first cruelty makes me abhor all imitation Delivered into our own custody the keys of life Denying all solicitation, both of hand and mind Depend as much upon fortune as anything else we do Desire of riches is more sharpened by their use than by the need Desire of travel Desires, that still increase as they are fulfilled Detest in others the defects which are more manifest in us Did my discourses came only from my mouth or from my heart Did not approve all sorts of means to obtain a victory Die well—that is, patiently and tranquilly Difference betwixt memory and understanding Difficulty gives all things their estimation Dignify our fopperies when we commit them to the press Diogenes, esteeming us no better than flies or bladders Discover what there is of good and clean in the bottom of the po Disdainful, contemplative, serious and grave as the ass Disease had arrived at its period or an

effect of chance? Disgorge what we eat in the same condition it was swallowed Disguise, by their abridgments and at their own choice Dissentient and tumultuary drugs Diversity of medical arguments and opinions embraces all Diverting the opinions and conjectures of the people Do not much blame them for making their advantage of our folly Do not to pray that all things may go as we would have them Do not, nevertheless, always believe myself Do thine own work, and know thyself Doctors: more felicity and duration in their own lives? Doctrine much more intricate and fantastic than the thing itself Dost thou, then, old man, collect food for others’ ears? Doubt whether those (old writings) we have be not the worst Doubtful ills plague us worst Downright and sincere obedience Drugs being in its own nature an enemy to our health Drunkeness a true and certain trial of every one’s nature Dying appears to him a natural and indifferent accident Each amongst you has made somebody cuckold Eat your bread with the sauce of a more pleasing imagination Education Education ought to be carried on with a severe sweetness Effect and performance are not at all in our power Either tranquil life, or happy death Eloquence prejudices the subject it would advance Emperor Julian, surnamed the Apostate Endeavouring to be brief, I become obscure Engaged in the avenues of old age, being already past forty Enough to do to comfort myself, without having to console others Enslave our own contentment to the power of another?

Enters lightly into a quarrel is apt to go as lightly out of it Entertain us with fables: astrologers and physicians Epicurus Establish this proposition by authority and huffing Evade this tormenting and unprofitable knowledge Even the very promises of physic are incredible in themselves Events are a very poor testimony of our worth and parts Every abridgment of a good book is a foolish abridgment Every day travels towards death; the last only arrives at it Every government has a god at the head of it Every man thinks himself sufficiently intelligent Every place of retirement requires a walk Everything has many faces and several aspects Examine, who is better learned, than who is more learned Excel above the common rate in frivolous things Excuse myself from knowing anything which enslaves me to others Executions rather whet than dull the edge of vices Expresses more contempt and condemnation than the other Extend their anger and hatred beyond the dispute in question Extremity of philosophy is hurtful Fabric goes forming and piling itself up from hand to hand Fame: an echo, a dream, nay, the shadow of a dream Fancy that others cannot believe otherwise than as he does Fantastic gibberish of the prophetic canting Far more easy and pleasant to follow than to lead Fathers conceal their affection from their children Fault not to discern how far a man’s worth extends Fault will be theirs for having consulted me Fear and distrust invite and draw on offence Fear is more importunate and insupportable than death itself Fear of the fall more fevers me than the fall itself Fear to lose a thing, which being lost, cannot be lamented?

Fear was not that I should do ill, but that I should do nothing Fear: begets a terrible astonishment and confusion Feared, lest disgrace should make such delinquents desperate Feminine polity has a mysterious procedure Few men have been admired by their own domestics Few men have made a wife of a mistress, who have not repented it First informed who were to be the other guests First thing to be considered in love matters: a fitting time Flatterer in your old age or in your sickness Follies do not make me laugh, it is our wisdom which does Folly and absurdity are not to be cured by bare admonition Folly of gaping after future things Folly satisfied with itself than any reason can reasonably be Folly than to be moved and angry at the follies of the world Folly to hazard that upon the uncertainty of augmenting it Folly to put out their own light and shine by a borrowed lustre For fear of the laws and report of men For who ever thought he wanted sense?

Fortune heaped up five or six such-like incidents Fortune rules in all things Fortune sometimes seems to delight in taking us at our word Fortune will still be mistress of events Fox, who found fault with what he could not obtain Friend, it is not now time to play with your nails Friend, the hook will not stick in such soft cheese Friendships that the law and natural obligation impose upon us Fruits of public commotion are seldom enjoyed Gain to change an ill condition for one that is uncertain Gave them new and more plausible names for their excuse Gentleman would play the fool to make a show of defence Gently to bear the inconstancy of a lover Gewgaw to hang in a cabinet or at the end of the tongue Give but the rind of my attention Give me time to recover my strength and health Give the ladies a cruel contempt of our natural furniture Give these young wenches the things they long for Give us history, more as they receive it than as they believe it Giving is an ambitious and authoritative quality Glory and curiosity are the scourges of the soul Go out of ourselves, because we know not how there to reside Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed Good to be certain and finite, and evil, infinite and uncertain Got up but an inch upon the shoulders of the last, but one Gradations above and below pleasure Gratify the gods and nature by massacre and murder Great presumption to be so fond of one’s own opinions Greatest apprehensions, from things unseen, concealed Greatest talkers, for the most part, do nothing to purpose Greedy humour of new and unknown things Grief provokes itself Gross impostures of religions Guess at our meaning under general and doubtful terms Happen to do anything commendable, I attribute it to fortune Hard to resolve a man’s judgment against the common opinions Haste trips up its own heels, fetters, and stops itself Hate all sorts of obligation and restraint Hate remedies that are more troublesome than the disease itself Have ever had a great respect for her I loved Have more wherewith to defray my journey, than I have way to go Have no other title left me to these things but by the ears Have you ever found any who have been dissatisfied with dying?

Passages expressing a similar idea

  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER V. ANGER IS NEITHER WARRANTABLE NOR USEFUL.

    It is high time to convince the world of the indignity and uselessness of this passion, when it has the authority and recommendation of no less than Aristotle himself, as an affection very much conducing to all heroic actions that require heat and vigor: now, to show, on the other side, that it is not in any case profitable, we shall lay open the obstinate and unbridled madness of it: a wickedness neither sensible of infamy nor of glory, without either modesty or fear; and if it passes once from anger into a hardened hatred, it is incurable. It is either stronger than reason, or it is weaker. If stronger, there is no contending with it; if weaker, reason will do the business without it. Some will have it that an angry man is good-natured and sincere; whereas, in truth, he only lays himself open out of heedlessness and want of caution. If it were in itself good the more of it the better; but in this case, the more the worse; and a wise man does his duty, without the aid of anything that is ill. It is objected by some, that those are the most generous creatures which are the most prone to anger. But, first, reason in man is impetuous in beasts. Secondly, without discipline it runs into audaciousness and temerity; over and above that, the same thing does not help all. If anger helps the lion, it is fear that saves the stag, swiftness the hawk, and flight the pigeon: but man has God for his example (who is never angry) and not the creatures. And yet it is not amiss sometimes to counterfeit anger; as upon the stage; nay, upon the bench, and in the pulpit, where the imitation of it is more effectual than the thing itself.

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER XIV. IT IS ACCORDING TO THE TRUE OR FALSE ESTIMATE OF THINGS THAT WE ARE HAPPY OR MISERABLE.

    The Stoics hold, that all those torments that commonly draw from us groans and ejaculations, are in themselves trivial and contemptible. But these high-flown expressions apart (how true soever) let us discourse the point at the rate of ordinary men, and not make ourselves miserable before our time; for the things we apprehend to be at hand may possibly never come to pass. Some things trouble us more than they should, other things sooner; and some things again disorder us that ought not to trouble us at all; so that we either enlarge, or create, or anticipate our disquiets. For the first part, let it rest as a matter in controversy; for that which I account light, another perhaps will judge insupportable! One man laughs under the lash, and another whines for a fillip. How sad a calamity is poverty to one man, which to another appears rather desirable than inconvenient? For the poor man, who has nothing to lose, has nothing to fear: and he that would enjoy himself to the satisfaction of his soul, must be either poor indeed, or at least look as if he were so. Some people are extremely dejected with sickness and pain; whereas Epicurus blessed his fate with his last breath, in the acutest torments of the stone imaginable. And so for banishment, which to one man is so grievous, and yet to another is no more than a bare change of place: a thing that we do every day for our health, pleasure, nay, and upon the account even of common business.

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER XVI. CONSTANCY OF MIND GIVES A MAN REPUTATION, AND MAKES HIM HAPPY IN DESPITE OF ALL MISFORTUNE.

    Epicurus will have it, that a wise man will bear all injuries; but the Stoics will not allow those things to be injuries which Epicurus calls so. Now, betwixt these two, there is the same difference that we find betwixt two gladiators; the one receives wounds, but yet maintains his ground, the other tells the people, when he is in blood, that it is but a scratch, and will not suffer anybody to part them. An injury cannot be received, but it must be done; but it may be done and yet not received; as a man may be in the water, and not swim, but if he swims, it is presumed that he is in the water. Or if a blow or a shot be levelled at us, it may so happen that a man may miss his aim, or some accident interpose that may divert the mischief. That which is hurt is passive, and inferior to that which hurts it. But you will say, that Socrates was condemned and put to death, and so received an injury; but I answer, that the tyrants did him an injury, and yet he received none. He that steals anything from me and hides it in my own house, though I have not lost it, yet he has stolen it. He that lies with his own wife, and takes her for another woman, though the woman be honest, the man is an adulterer. Suppose a man gives me a draught of poison and it proves not strong enough to kill me, his guilt is nevertheless for the disappointment. He that makes a pass at me is as much a murderer, though I put it by, as if he had struck me to the heart. It is the intention, not the effect, that makes the wickedness. He is a thief that has the will of killing and slaying, before his hand is dipt in blood; as it is sacrilege, the very intention of laying violent hands upon holy things. If a philosopher be exposed to torments, the ax over his head, his body wounded, his guts in his hands, I will allow him to groan; for virtue itself cannot divest him of the nature of a man; but if his mind stand firm, he has discharged his part. A great mind enables a man to maintain his station with honor; so that he only makes use of what he meets in his way, as a pilgrim that would fain be at his journey’s end.

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  • The Praise of Folly · Desiderius Erasmus (1469–1536) · Section 2

    But counsel, you'll say, is not of least concern in matters of war. In a general I grant it; but this thing of warring is not part of philosophy, but managed by parasites, panders, thieves, cut-throats, plowmen, sots, spendthrifts, and such other dregs of mankind, not philosophers; who how unapt they are even for common converse, let Socrates, whom the oracle of Apollo, though not so wisely, judged "the wisest of all men living," be witness; who stepping up to speak somewhat, I know not what, in public was forced to come down again well laughed at for his pains. Though yet in this he was not altogether a fool, that he refused the appellation of wise, and returning it back to the oracle, delivered his opinion that a wise man should abstain from meddling with public business; unless perhaps he should have rather admonished us to beware of wisdom if we intended to be reckoned among the number of men, there being nothing but his wisdom that first accused and afterwards sentenced him to the drinking of his poisoned cup. For while, as you find him in Aristophanes, philosophizing about clouds and ideas, measuring how far a flea could leap, and admiring that so small a creature as a fly should make so great a buzz, he meddled not with anything that concerned common life. But his master being in danger of his head, his scholar Plato is at hand, to wit that famous patron, that being disturbed with the noise of the people, could not go through half his first sentence. What should I speak of Theophrastus, who being about to make an oration, became as dumb as if he had met a wolf in his way, which yet would have put courage in a man of war? Or Isocrates, that was so cowhearted that he dared never attempt it? Or Tully, that great founder of the Roman eloquence, that could never begin to speak without an odd kind of trembling, like a boy that had got the hiccough; which Fabius interprets as an argument of a wise orator and one that was sensible of what he was doing; and while he says it, does he not plainly confess that wisdom is a great obstacle to the true management of business? What would become of them, think you, were they to fight it out at blows that are so dead through fear when the contest is only with empty words?

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  • A Vindication of the Rights of Woman With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects · Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) · Section 11

    For every thing, saith the wise man, there is reason; and who would look for the fruits of autumn during the genial months of spring? But this is mere declamation, and I mean to reason with those worldly-wise instructors, who, instead of cultivating the judgment, instil prejudices, and render hard the heart that gradual experience would only have cooled. An early acquaintance with human infirmities; or, what is termed knowledge of the world, is the surest way, in my opinion, to contract the heart and damp the natural youthful ardour which produces not only great talents, but great virtues. For the vain attempt to bring forth the fruit of experience, before the sapling has thrown out its leaves, only exhausts its strength, and prevents its assuming a natural form; just as the form and strength of subsiding metals are injured when the attraction of cohesion is disturbed. Tell me, ye who have studied the human mind, is it not a strange way to fix principles by showing young people that they are seldom stable? And how can they be fortified by habits when they are proved to be fallacious by example? Why is the ardour of youth thus to be damped, and the luxuriancy of fancy cut to the quick? This dry caution may, it is true, guard a character from worldly mischances; but will infallibly preclude excellence in either virtue or knowledge. The stumbling-block thrown across every path by suspicion, will prevent any vigorous exertions of genius or benevolence, and life will be stripped of its most alluring charm long before its calm evening, when man should retire to contemplation for comfort and support.

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER VII. THE ORDINARY GROUNDS AND OCCASIONS OF ANGER.

    In this wandering state of life we meet with many occasions of trouble and displeasure, both great and trivial; and not a day passes but, from men or things, we have some cause or other for offense; as a man must expect to be jostled, dashed, and crowded, in a populous city. One man deceives our expectation; another delays it; and a third crosses it; and if everything does not succeed to our wish, we presently fall out either with the person, the business, the place, our fortune, or ourselves. Some men value themselves upon their wit, and will never forgive anyone that pretends to lessen it; others are inflamed by wine: and some are distempered by sickness, weariness, watchings, love, care, etc. Some are prone to it, by heat of constitution; but moist, dry, and cold complexions are more liable to other affections; as suspicion, despair, fear, jealousy, etc. But most of our quarrels are of our own contriving. One while we suspect upon mistake; and another while we make a great matter of trifles. To say the truth, most of those things that exasperate us are rather subjects of disgust than of mischief: there is a large difference betwixt opposing a man’s satisfaction and not assisting it: betwixt taking away and not giving; but we reckon upon denying and deferring as the same thing; and interpret another’s being for himself as if he were against us. Nay, we do many times entertain an ill opinion of well doing, and a good one of the contrary: and we hate a man for doing that very thing which we should hate him for on the other side, if he did not do it.

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