The Analects of Confucius (from the Chinese Classics)
Confucius (-551–-479)
CHAP. VIII. 1. The Master said, 'Yu, have you heard the six words to which are attached six becloudings?' Yu replied, 'I have not.' 2. 'Sit down, and I will tell them to you. 3. 'There is the love of being benevolent without the love of learning;— the beclouding here leads to a foolish simplicity. There is the love of knowing without the love of learning;— the beclouding here leads to dissipation of mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning;— the beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of learning;— the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of boldness without the love of learning;— the beclouding here leads to insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the love of learning;— the beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct.'
CHAP. IX. 1. The Master said, 'My children, why do you not study the Book of Poetry? 2. 'The Odes serve to stimulate the mind. 3. 'They may be used for purposes of self-contemplation. 4. 'They teach the art of sociability. 5. 'They show how to regulate feelings of resentment. 6. 'From them you learn the more immediate duty of serving one's father, and the remoter one of serving one's prince. 7. 'From them we become largely acquainted with the names of birds, beasts, and plants.' CHAP. X. The Master said to Po-yu, 'Do you give yourself to the Chau-nan and the Shao-nan. The man who has not studied the Chau-nan and the Shao-nan, is like one who stands with his face right against a wall. Is he not so?'
CHAP. XI. The Master said, '"It is according to the rules of propriety," they say.— "It is according to the rules of propriety," they say. Are gems and silk all that is meant by propriety? "It is music," they say.— "It is music," they say. Are bells and drums all that is meant by music?' CHAP. XII. The Master said, 'He who puts on an appearance of stern firmness, while inwardly he is weak, is like one of the small, mean people;— yea, is he not like the thief who breaks through, or climbs over, a wall?' CHAP. XIII. The Master said, 'Your good, careful people of the villages are the thieves of virtue.' CHAP. XIV. The Master said, 'To tell, as we go along, what we have heard on the way, is to cast away our virtue.'
CHAP. XV. 1. The Master said, 'There are those mean creatures! How impossible it is along with them to serve one's prince! 2. 'While they have not got their aims, their anxiety is how to get them. When they have got them, their anxiety is lest they should lose them. 3. 'When they are anxious lest such things should be lost, there is nothing to which they will not proceed.' CHAP. XVI. 1. The Master said, 'Anciently, men had three failings, which now perhaps are not to be found. 2. 'The high-mindedness of antiquity showed itself in a disregard of small things; the high-mindedness of the present day shows itself in wild license. The stern dignity of antiquity showed itself in grave reserve; the stern dignity of the present day shows itself in quarrelsome perverseness. The stupidity of antiquity showed itself in straightforwardness; the stupidity of the present day shows itself in sheer deceit.'
CHAP. XVII. The Master said, 'Fine words and an insinuating appearance are seldom associated with virtue.' CHAP. XVIII. The Master said, 'I hate the manner in which purple takes away the luster of vermilion. I hate the way in which the songs of Chang confound the music of the Ya. I hate those who with their sharp mouths overthrow kingdoms and families.' CHAP. XIX. 1. The Master said, 'I would prefer not speaking.' 2. Tsze-kung said, 'If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we, your disciples, have to record?' 3. The Master said, 'Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything?'
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · BOOK II / Chapter I.
Again, every Virtue is either produced or destroyed from and by the very same circumstances: art too in like manner; I mean it is by playing the harp that both the good and the bad harp-players are formed: and similarly builders and all the rest; by building well men will become good builders; by doing it badly bad ones: in fact, if this had not been so, there would have been no need of instructors, but all men would have been at once good or bad in their several arts without them. So too then is it with the Virtues: for by acting in the various relations in which we are thrown with our fellow men, we come to be, some just, some unjust: and by acting in dangerous positions and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we come to be, some brave, others cowards. Similarly is it also with respect to the occasions of lust and anger: for some men come to be perfected in self-mastery and mild, others destitute of all self-control and passionate; the one class by behaving in one way under them, the other by behaving in another. Or, in one word, the habits are produced from the acts of working like to them: and so what we have to do is to give a certain character to these particular acts, because the habits formed correspond to the differences of these. So then, whether we are accustomed this way or that straight from childhood, makes not a small but an important difference, or rather I would say it makes all the difference.
Read in contextPolitics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER IV
As if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to themselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a good magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some particular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different from the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason declared that was he deprived of his kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things well is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a good man consists only in being able to command, but the virtue of a good citizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other, the commendation of both of them is not the same. It appears, then, that both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn their separate business: but that the citizen should be master of and take part in both these, as any one may easily perceive; in a family government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for to do the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common family business of the slave.
Read in contextPolitics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER VII
There are two things to be taken into consideration, both what is possible and what is proper; every one then should chiefly endeavour to attain those things which contain both these qualities: but this is to be regulated by different times of life; for instance, it is not easy for those who are advanced in years to sing such pieces of music as require very high notes, for nature points out to them those which are gentle and require little strength of voice (for which reason some who are skilful in music justly find fault with Socrates for forbidding the youth to be instructed in gentle harmony; as if, like wine, it would make them drunk, whereas the effect of that is to render men bacchanals, and not make them languid): these therefore are what should employ those who are grown old. Moreover, if there is any harmony which is proper for a child's age, as being at the same time elegant and instructive, as the Lydian of all others seems chiefly to be-These then are as it were the three boundaries of education, moderation, possibility, and decorum.
Read in contextPolitics: A Treatise on Government · Aristotle (-384–-322) · CHAPTER V
With respect to music we have already spoken a little in a doubtful manner upon this subject. It will be proper to go over again more particularly what we then said, which may serve as an introduction to what any other person may choose to offer thereon; for it is no easy matter to distinctly point out what power it has, nor on what accounts one should apply it, whether as an amusement and refreshment, as sleep or wine; as these are nothing serious, but pleasing, and the killers of care, as Euripides says; for which reason they class in the same order and use for the same purpose all these, namely, sleep, wine, and music, to which some add dancing; or shall we rather suppose that music tends to be productive of virtue, having a power, as the gymnastic exercises have to form the body in a certain way, to influence the manners so as to accustom its professors to rejoice rightly? or shall we say, that it is of any service in the conduct of life, and an assistant to prudence? for this also is a third property which has been attributed to it.
Read in contextThe Republic · Plato (-428–-348) · BOOK I
And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man or action, in order that he may have more than all? True. We may put the matter thus, I said—the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike? Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement. And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither? Good again, he said. And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them? Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not. Each of them, I said, is such as his like is? Certainly, he replied. Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician? Yes. And which is wise and which is foolish? Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish. And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish? Yes. And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician? Yes. And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?
Read in contextThe Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter III.
Again, the cases of the arts and the virtues are not parallel: because those things which are produced by the arts have their excellence in themselves, and it is sufficient therefore that these when produced should be in a certain state: but those which are produced in the way of the virtues, are, strictly speaking, actions of a certain kind (say of Justice or perfected Self-Mastery), not merely if in themselves they are in a certain state but if also he who does them does them being himself in a certain state, first if knowing what he is doing, next if with deliberate preference, and with such preference for the things’ own sake; and thirdly if being himself stable and unapt to change. Now to constitute possession of the arts these requisites are not reckoned in, excepting the one point of knowledge: whereas for possession of the virtues knowledge avails little or nothing, but the other requisites avail not a little, but, in fact, are all in all, and these requisites as a matter of fact do come from oftentimes doing the actions of Justice and perfected Self-Mastery. The facts,[8] it is true, are called by the names of these habits when they are such as the just or perfectly self-mastering man would do; but he is not in possession of the virtues who merely does these facts, but he who also so does them as the just and self-mastering do them.
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