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The Analects of Confucius (from the Chinese Classics)

Confucius (-551–-479)

CHAP. XXVI. The Master said, 'Specious words confound virtue. Want of forbearance in small matters confounds great plans.' CHAP. XXVII. The Master said, 'When the multitude hate a man, it is necessary to examine into the case. When the multitude like a man, it is necessary to examine into the case.' CHAP. XXVIII. The Master said, 'A man can enlarge the principles which he follows; those principles do not enlarge the man.' CHAP. XXIX. The Master said, 'To have faults and not to reform them,— this, indeed, should be pronounced having faults.' CHAP. XXX. The Master said, 'I have been the whole day

without eating, and the whole night without sleeping:— occupied with thinking. It was of no use. The better plan is to learn.' CHAP. XXXI. The Master said, 'The object of the superior man is truth. Food is not his object. There is plowing;— even in that there is sometimes want. So with learning;— emolument may be found in it. The superior man is anxious lest he should not get truth; he is not anxious lest poverty should come upon him.' CHAP. XXXII. 1. The Master said, 'When a man's knowledge is sufficient to attain, and his virtue is not sufficient to enable him to hold, whatever he may have gained, he will lose again. 2. 'When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has virtue enough to hold fast, if he cannot govern with dignity, the people will not respect him. 3. 'When his knowledge is sufficient to attain, and he has virtue enough to hold fast; when he governs also with dignity, yet if he try to move the people contrary to the rules of propriety:— full excellence is not reached.'

CHAP. XXXIII. The Master said, 'The superior man cannot be known in little matters; but he may be intrusted with great concerns. The small man may not be intrusted with great concerns, but he may be known in little matters.' CHAP. XXXIV. The Master said, 'Virtue is more to man than either water or fire. I have seen men die from treading on water and fire, but I have never seen a man die from treading the course of virtue.' CHAP. XXXV. The Master said, 'Let every man consider virtue as what devolves on himself. He may not yield the performance of it even to his teacher.' CHAP. XXXVI. The Master said, 'The superior man is correctly firm, and not firm merely.' CHAP. XXXVII. The Master said, 'A minister, in serving his prince, reverently discharges his duties, and makes his emolument a secondary consideration.' CHAP. XXXVIII. The Master said, 'In teaching there should be no distinction of classes.' CHAP. XXXIX. The Master said, 'Those whose courses are different cannot lay plans for one another.' CHAP. XL. The Master said, 'In language it is simply required that it convey the meaning.' CHAP. XLI. 1. The Music-master, Mien, having called upon him, when they came to the steps, the Master said, 'Here are the steps.' When they came to the mat for the guest to sit upon, he

said, 'Here is the mat.' When all were seated, the Master informed him, saying, 'So and so is here; so and so is here.' 2. The Music-master, Mien, having gone out, Tsze-chang asked, saying. 'Is it the rule to tell those things to the Music- master?' 3. The Master said, 'Yes. This is certainly the rule for those who lead the blind.' BOOK XVI. KE SHE.

CHAP. I. 1. The head of the Chi family was going to attack Chwan-yu. 2. Zan Yu and Chi-lu had an interview with Confucius, and said, 'Our chief, Chi, is going to commence operations against Chwan-yu.' 3. Confucius said, 'Ch'iu, is it not you who are in fault here? 4. 'Now, in regard to Chwan-yu, long ago, a former king appointed its ruler to preside over the sacrifices to the eastern Mang; moreover, it is in the midst of the territory of our State; and its ruler is a minister in direct connexion with the sovereign:— What has your chief to do with attacking it?' 5. Zan Yu said, 'Our master wishes the thing; neither of us two ministers wishes it.' 6. Confucius said, 'Ch'iu, there are the words of Chau Zan,— "When he can put forth his ability, he takes his place in the ranks of office; when he finds himself unable to do so, he retires from it. How can he be used as a guide to a blind man, who does not support him when tottering, nor raise him up when fallen?" 7. 'And further, you speak wrongly. When a tiger or rhinoceros escapes from his cage; when a tortoise or piece of jade is injured in its repository:— whose is the fault?' 8. Zan Yu said, 'But at present, Chwan-yu is strong and near to Pi; if our chief do not now take it, it will hereafter be a sorrow to his descendants.' 9. Confucius said. 'Ch'iu, the superior man hates that declining to say— "I want such and such a thing," and framing explanations for the conduct. 10. 'I have heard that rulers of States and chiefs of families are not troubled lest their people should be few, but are troubled lest they should not keep their several places; that they are not troubled with fears of poverty, but are troubled with fears of a want of contented repose among the people in their several places. For when the people keep their several places, there will be no poverty; when harmony prevails, there will be no scarcity of people; and when there is such a contented repose, there will be no rebellious upsettings. 11. 'So it is.— Therefore, if remoter people are not submissive, all

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