The Idiot
Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1821–1881)
“She is worthy of sympathy? Is that what you wished to say, my good fellow? But then, for the mere sake of vindicating her worthiness of sympathy, you should not have insulted and offended a noble and generous girl in her presence! This is a terrible exaggeration of sympathy! How can you love a girl, and yet so humiliate her as to throw her over for the sake of another woman, before the very eyes of that other woman, when you have already made her a formal proposal of marriage? And you did propose to her, you know; you did so before her parents and sisters. Can you be an honest man, prince, if you act so? I ask you! And did you not deceive that beautiful girl when you assured her of your love?” “Yes, you are quite right. Oh! I feel that I am very guilty!” said Muishkin, in deepest distress. “But as if that is enough!” cried Evgenie, indignantly. “As if it is enough simply to say: ‘I know I am very guilty!’ You are to blame, and yet you persevere in evil-doing. Where was your heart, I should like to know, your christian heart, all that time? Did she look as though she were suffering less, at that moment? You saw her face—was she suffering less than the other woman? How could you see her suffering and allow it to continue? How could you?” “But I did not allow it,” murmured the wretched prince. “How—what do you mean you didn’t allow?”
“Upon my word, I didn’t! To this moment I don’t know how it all happened. I—I ran after Aglaya Ivanovna, but Nastasia Philipovna fell down in a faint; and since that day they won’t let me see Aglaya—that’s all I know.” “It’s all the same; you ought to have run after Aglaya though the other was fainting.” “Yes, yes, I ought—but I couldn’t! She would have died—she would have killed herself. You don’t know her; and I should have told Aglaya everything afterwards—but I see, Evgenie Pavlovitch, you don’t know all. Tell me now, why am I not allowed to see Aglaya? I should have cleared it all up, you know. Neither of them kept to the real point, you see. I could never explain what I mean to you, but I think I could to Aglaya. Oh! my God, my God! You spoke just now of Aglaya’s face at the moment when she ran away. Oh, my God! I remember it! Come along, come along—quick!” He pulled at Evgenie’s coat-sleeve nervously and excitedly, and rose from his chair. “Where to?” “Come to Aglaya—quick, quick!” “But I told you she is not at Pavlofsk. And what would be the use if she were?” “Oh, she’ll understand, she’ll understand!” cried the prince, clasping his hands. “She would understand that all this is not the point—not a bit the real point—it is quite foreign to the real question.”
“How can it be foreign? You are going to be married, are you not? Very well, then you are persisting in your course. Are you going to marry her or not?” “Yes, I shall marry her—yes.” “Then why is it ‘not the point’?” “Oh, no, it is not the point, not a bit. It makes no difference, my marrying her—it means nothing.” “How ‘means nothing’? You are talking nonsense, my friend. You are marrying the woman you love in order to secure her happiness, and Aglaya sees and knows it. How can you say that it’s ‘not the point’?”
“Her happiness? Oh, no! I am only marrying her—well, because she wished it. It means nothing—it’s all the same. She would certainly have died. I see now that that marriage with Rogojin was an insane idea. I understand all now that I did not understand before; and, do you know, when those two stood opposite to one another, I could not bear Nastasia Philipovna’s face! You must know, Evgenie Pavlovitch, I have never told anyone before—not even Aglaya—that I cannot bear Nastasia Philipovna’s face.” (He lowered his voice mysteriously as he said this.) “You described that evening at Nastasia Philipovna’s (six months since) very accurately just now; but there is one thing which you did not mention, and of which you took no account, because you do not know. I mean her face—I looked at her face, you see. Even in the morning when I saw her portrait, I felt that I could not bear to look at it. Now, there’s Vera Lebedeff, for instance, her eyes are quite different, you know. I’m afraid of her face!” he added, with real alarm. “You are afraid of it?” “Yes—she’s mad!” he whispered, growing pale. “Do you know this for certain?” asked Evgenie, with the greatest curiosity. “Yes, for certain—quite for certain, now! I have discovered it absolutely for certain, these last few days.” “What are you doing, then?” cried Evgenie, in horror. “You must be marrying her solely out of fear, then! I can’t make head or tail of it, prince. Perhaps you don’t even love her?”
“Oh, no; I love her with all my soul. Why, she is a child! She’s a child now—a real child. Oh! you know nothing about it at all, I see.” “And are you assured, at the same time, that you love Aglaya too?” “Yes—yes—oh; yes!” “How so? Do you want to make out that you love them both?” “Yes—yes—both! I do!” “Excuse me, prince, but think what you are saying! Recollect yourself!” “Without Aglaya—I—I must see Aglaya!—I shall die in my sleep very soon—I thought I was dying in my sleep last night. Oh! if Aglaya only knew all—I mean really, really all! Because she must know all—that’s the first condition towards understanding. Why cannot we ever know all about another, especially when that other has been guilty? But I don’t know what I’m talking about—I’m so confused. You pained me so dreadfully. Surely—surely Aglaya has not the same expression now as she had at the moment when she ran away? Oh, yes! I am guilty and I know it—I know it! Probably I am in fault all round—I don’t quite know how—but I am in fault, no doubt. There is something else, but I cannot explain it to you, Evgenie Pavlovitch. I have no words; but Aglaya will understand. I have always believed Aglaya will understand—I am assured she will.”
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Ambassadors · Henry James (1843–1916) · Volume II / Book Seventh / I
“Well,” Strether presently concluded, “nothing could really hurt you but his marrying.” She gave a strange light laugh. “Putting aside what may really hurt him.” But her friend looked at her as if he had thought of that too. “The question will come up, of course, of the future that you yourself offer him.” She was leaning back now, but she fully faced him. “Well, let it come up!” “The point is that it’s for Chad to make of it what he can. His being proof against marriage will show what he does make.” “If he is proof, yes”—she accepted the proposition. “But for myself,” she added, “the question is what you make.” “Ah I make nothing. It’s not my affair.” “I beg your pardon. It’s just there that, since you’ve taken it up and are committed to it, it most intensely becomes yours. You’re not saving me, I take it, for your interest in myself, but for your interest in our friend. The one’s at any rate wholly dependent on the other. You can’t in honour not see me through,” she wound up, “because you can’t in honour not see him.”
Read in contextWomen in Love · D. H. (David Herbert) Lawrence (1885–1930) · CHAPTER XXV. MARRIAGE OR NOT
“And all sorts of marriage, also snub and otherwise?” he said. “That’s it.” “And you think if I marry, it will be snub?” asked Gerald quizzically, his head a little on one side. Birkin laughed quickly. “How do I know what it will be!” he said. “Don’t lambaste me with my own parallels—” Gerald pondered a while. “But I should like to know your opinion, exactly,” he said. “On your marriage?—or marrying? Why should you want my opinion? I’ve got no opinions. I’m not interested in legal marriage, one way or another. It’s a mere question of convenience.” Still Gerald watched him closely. “More than that, I think,” he said seriously. “However you may be bored by the ethics of marriage, yet really to marry, in one’s own personal case, is something critical, final—” “You mean there is something final in going to the registrar with a woman?” “If you’re coming back with her, I do,” said Gerald. “It is in some way irrevocable.” “Yes, I agree,” said Birkin. “No matter how one regards legal marriage, yet to enter into the married state, in one’s own personal instance, is final—” “I believe it is,” said Birkin, “somewhere.” “The question remains then, should one do it,” said Gerald. Birkin watched him narrowly, with amused eyes. “You are like Lord Bacon, Gerald,” he said. “You argue it like a lawyer—or like Hamlet’s to-be-or-not-to-be. If I were you I would not marry: but ask Gudrun, not me. You’re not marrying me, are you?” Gerald did not heed the latter part of this speech.
Read in contextThe Kreutzer Sonata and Other Stories · Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910) · CHAPTER II.
“And how, then, can ordinary love consecrate marriage?” continued the nervous gentleman, still excited, and with a displeased air. He seemed to wish to say something disagreeable to the lady. She felt it, and began to grow agitated. “How? Why, very simply,” said she. The nervous gentleman seized the word as it left her lips. “No, not simply.” “Madam says,” interceded the lawyer indicating his companion, “that marriage should be first the result of an attachment, of a love, if you will, and that, when love exists, and in that case only, marriage represents something sacred. But every marriage which is not based on a natural attachment, on love, has in it nothing that is morally obligatory. Is not that the idea that you intended to convey?” he asked the lady. The lady, with a nod of her head, expressed her approval of this translation of her thoughts. “Then,” resumed the lawyer, continuing his remarks. But the nervous gentleman, evidently scarcely able to contain himself, without allowing the lawyer to finish, asked: “Yes, sir. But what are we to understand by this love that alone consecrates marriage?” “Everybody knows what love is,” said the lady. “But I don’t know, and I should like to know how you define it.” “How? It is very simple,” said the lady. And she seemed thoughtful, and then said: “Love . . . love . . . is a preference for one man or one woman to the exclusion of all others. . . .”
Read in contextFar from the Madding Crowd · Thomas Hardy (1840–1928) · CHAPTER XXI. BATHSHEBA TALKS WITH HER OUTRIDER
“Which?” “How do you mean which?” “Do you like me, or do you respect me?” “I don’t know—at least, I cannot tell you. It is difficult for a woman to define her feelings in language which is chiefly made by men to express theirs. My treatment of you was thoughtless, inexcusable, wicked. I shall eternally regret it. If there had been anything I could have done to make amends I would most gladly have done it—there was nothing on earth I so longed to do as to repair the error. But that was not possible.” “Don’t blame yourself—you were not so far in the wrong as you suppose. Bathsheba, suppose you had real complete proof that you are what, in fact, you are—a widow—would you repair the old wrong to me by marrying me?” “I cannot say. I shouldn’t yet, at any rate.” “But you might at some future time of your life?” “Oh yes, I might at some time.” “Well, then, do you know that without further proof of any kind you may marry again in about six years from the present—subject to nobody’s objection or blame?” “Oh yes,” she said, quickly. “I know all that. But don’t talk of it—seven or six years—where may we all be by that time?” “They will soon glide by, and it will seem an astonishingly short time to look back upon when they are past—much less than to look forward to now.” “Yes, yes; I have found that in my own experience.”
Read in contextHistory of Tom Jones, a Foundling · Henry Fielding (1707–1754) · Chapter ix. — Containing strange matters.
“How, Jack?” said the old gentleman, “and are you really then not married to this young woman?” “No, upon my honour,” answered Nightingale, “I have told you the simple truth.” “My dear boy,” cries the uncle, kissing him, “I am heartily glad to hear it. I never was better pleased in my life. If you had been married I should have assisted you as much as was in my power to have made the best of a bad matter; but there is a great difference between considering a thing which is already done and irrecoverable, and that which is yet to do. Let your reason have fair play, Jack, and you will see this match in so foolish and preposterous a light, that there will be no need of any dissuasive arguments.” “How, sir?” replies young Nightingale, “is there this difference between having already done an act, and being in honour engaged to do it?” “Pugh!” said the uncle, “honour is a creature of the world's making, and the world hath the power of a creator over it, and may govern and direct it as they please. Now you well know how trivial these breaches of contract are thought; even the grossest make but the wonder and conversation of a day. Is there a man who afterwards will be more backward in giving you his sister, or daughter? or is there any sister or daughter who would be more backward to receive you? Honour is not concerned in these engagements.”
Read in contextThe Adventures of Sherlock Holmes · Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930) · X. THE ADVENTURE OF THE NOBLE BACHELOR
“Yes, her father brought her over for this last London season. I met her several times, became engaged to her, and have now married her.” “She brought, I understand, a considerable dowry?” “A fair dowry. Not more than is usual in my family.” “And this, of course, remains to you, since the marriage is a fait accompli?” “I really have made no inquiries on the subject.” “Very naturally not. Did you see Miss Doran on the day before the wedding?” “Yes.” “Was she in good spirits?” “Never better. She kept talking of what we should do in our future lives.” “Indeed! That is very interesting. And on the morning of the wedding?” “She was as bright as possible—at least until after the ceremony.” “And did you observe any change in her then?” “Well, to tell the truth, I saw then the first signs that I had ever seen that her temper was just a little sharp. The incident however, was too trivial to relate and can have no possible bearing upon the case.” “Pray let us have it, for all that.”
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