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The Song Celestial; Or, Bhagavad-Gîtâ (from the Mahâbhârata) Being a discourse between Arjuna, Prince of India, and the Supreme Being under the form of Krishna

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The faith of each believer, Indian Prince! Conforms itself to what he truly is. Where thou shalt see a worshipper, that one To what he worships lives assimilate, [Such as the shrine, so is the votary,] The "soothfast" souls adore true gods; the souls Obeying Rajas worship Rakshasas[FN#34] Or Yakshas; and the men of Darkness pray To Pretas and to Bhutas.[FN#35] Yea, and those Who practise bitter penance, not enjoined By rightful rule--penance which hath its root In self-sufficient, proud hypocrisies-- Those men, passion-beset, violent, wild, Torturing--the witless ones--My elements Shut in fair company within their flesh, (Nay, Me myself, present within the flesh!) Know them to devils devoted, not to Heaven! For like as foods are threefold for mankind In nourishing, so is there threefold way Of worship, abstinence, and almsgiving! Hear this of Me! there is a food which brings Force, substance, strength, and health, and joy to live, Being well-seasoned, cordial, comforting, The "Soothfast" meat. And there be foods which bring Aches and unrests, and burning blood, and grief, Being too biting, heating, salt, and sharp, And therefore craved by too strong appetite. And there is foul food--kept from over-night,[FN#36] Savourless, filthy, which the foul will eat, A feast of rottenness, meet for the lips Of such as love the "Darkness."

Thus with rites;-- A sacrifice not for rewardment made, Offered in rightful wise, when he who vows Sayeth, with heart devout, "This I should do!" Is "Soothfast" rite. But sacrifice for gain, Offered for good repute, be sure that this, O Best of Bharatas! is Rajas-rite, With stamp of "passion." And a sacrifice Offered against the laws, with no due dole Of food-giving, with no accompaniment Of hallowed hymn, nor largesse to the priests, In faithless celebration, call it vile, The deed of "Darkness!"--lost! Worship of gods Meriting worship; lowly reverence Of Twice-borns, Teachers, Elders; Purity, Rectitude, and the Brahmacharya's vow, And not to injure any helpless thing,-- These make a true religiousness of Act. Words causing no man woe, words ever true, Gentle and pleasing words, and those ye say In murmured reading of a Sacred Writ,-- These make the true religiousness of Speech. Serenity of soul, benignity, Sway of the silent Spirit, constant stress To sanctify the Nature,--these things make Good rite, and true religiousness of Mind. Such threefold faith, in highest piety Kept, with no hope of gain, by hearts devote, Is perfect work of Sattwan, true belief. Religion shown in act of proud display To win good entertainment, worship, fame, Such--say I--is of Rajas, rash and vain. Religion followed by a witless will To torture self, or come at power to hurt Another,--'tis of Tamas, dark and ill.

The gift lovingly given, when one shall say "Now must I gladly give!" when he who takes Can render nothing back; made in due place, Due time, and to a meet recipient, Is gift of Sattwan, fair and profitable. The gift selfishly given, where to receive Is hoped again, or when some end is sought, Or where the gift is proffered with a grudge, This is of Rajas, stained with impulse, ill. The gift churlishly flung, at evil time, In wrongful place, to base recipient, Made in disdain or harsh unkindliness, Is gift of Tamas, dark; it doth not bless![FN#37] HERE ENDETH CHAPTER XVII. OF THE BHAGAVAD-GITA, Entitled "Sraddhatrayavibhagayog," Or "The Book of Religion by the Threefold Kinds of Faith."

Arjuna. Fain would I better know, Thou Glorious One! The very truth--Heart's Lord!--of Sannyas, Abstention; and enunciation, Lord! Tyaga; and what separates these twain! Krishna. The poets rightly teach that Sannyas Is the foregoing of all acts which spring Out of desire; and their wisest say Tyaga is renouncing fruit of acts. There be among the saints some who have held All action sinful, and to be renounced; And some who answer, "Nay! the goodly acts-- As worship, penance, alms--must be performed!" Hear now My sentence, Best of Bharatas! 'Tis well set forth, O Chaser of thy Foes! Renunciation is of threefold form, And Worship, Penance, Alms, not to be stayed; Nay, to be gladly done; for all those three Are purifying waters for true souls! Yet must be practised even those high works In yielding up attachment, and all fruit Produced by works. This is My judgment, Prince! This My insuperable and fixed decree!

Abstaining from a work by right prescribed Never is meet! So to abstain doth spring From "Darkness," and Delusion teacheth it. Abstaining from a work grievous to flesh, When one saith "'Tis unpleasing!" this is null! Such an one acts from "passion;" nought of gain Wins his Renunciation! But, Arjun! Abstaining from attachment to the work, Abstaining from rewardment in the work, While yet one doeth it full faithfully, Saying, "Tis right to do!" that is "true " act And abstinence! Who doeth duties so, Unvexed if his work fail, if it succeed Unflattered, in his own heart justified, Quit of debates and doubts, his is "true" act: For, being in the body, none may stand Wholly aloof from act; yet, who abstains From profit of his acts is abstinent. The fruit of labours, in the lives to come, Is threefold for all men,--Desirable, And Undesirable, and mixed of both; But no fruit is at all where no work was.

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  • Essays of Michel de Montaigne — Complete · Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) · CHAPTER IX——OF VANITY

    As giving is an ambitious and authoritative quality, so is accepting a quality of submission; witness the insulting and quarrelsome refusal that Bajazet made of the presents that Tamerlane sent him; and those that were offered on the part of the Emperor Solyman to the Emperor of Calicut, so angered him, that he not only rudely rejected them, saying that neither he nor any of his predecessors had ever been wont to take, and that it was their office to give; but, moreover, caused the ambassadors sent with the gifts to be put into a dungeon. When Thetis, says Aristotle, flatters Jupiter, when the Lacedaemonians flatter the Athenians, they do not put them in mind of the good they have done them, which is always odious, but of the benefits they have received from them. Such as I see so frequently employ every one in their affairs, and thrust themselves into so much obligation, would never do it, did they but relish as I do the sweetness of a pure liberty, and did they but weigh, as wise: men should, the burden of obligation: ‘tis sometimes, peradventure, fully paid, but ‘tis never dissolved. ‘Tis a miserable slavery to a man who loves to be at full liberty in all reapects. Such as know me, both above and below me in station, are able to say whether they have ever known a man less importuning, soliciting, entreating, and pressing upon others than I.

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  • The Confessions of St. Augustine · of Hippo Augustine (354–430) · BOOK XIII

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter XIII.

    For they who have received kindnesses frequently plead in depreciation that they have received from their benefactors such things as were small for them to give, or such as they themselves could have got from others: while the doers of the kindnesses affirm that they gave the best they had, and what could not have been got from others, and under danger, or in such-like straits. May we not say, that as utility is the motive of the Friendship the advantage conferred on the receiver must be the standard? because he it is who requests the kindness and the other serves him in his need on the understanding that he is to get an equivalent: the assistance rendered is then exactly proportionate to the advantage which the receiver has obtained, and he should therefore repay as much as he gained by it, or even more, this being more creditable. In Friendships based on goodness, the question, of course, is never raised, but herein the motive of the doer seems to be the proper standard, since virtue and moral character depend principally on motive.

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  • Seneca's Morals of a Happy Life, Benefits, Anger and Clemency · Lucius Annaeus Seneca · CHAPTER XVI. HOW THE RECEIVER OUGHT TO BEHAVE HIMSELF.

    There are certain rules in common betwixt the giver and the receiver. We must do both cheerfully, that the giver may receive the fruit of his benefit in the very act of bestowing it. It is a just ground of satisfaction to see a friend pleased; but it is much more to make him so. The intention of the one is to be suited to the intention of the other; and there must be an emulation betwixt them, whether shall oblige most. Let the one say, that he has received a benefit, and let the other persuade himself that he has not returned it. Let the one say, I am paid, and the other, I am yet in your debt; let the benefactor acquit the receiver, and the receiver bind himself. The frankness of the discharge heightens the obligation. It is in conversation as in a tennis-court; benefits are to be tossed like balls; the longer the rest, the better are the gamesters. The giver, in some respect, has the odds, because (as in a race) he starts first, and the other must use great diligence to overtake him. The return must be larger than the first obligation to come up to it; and it is a kind of ingratitude not to render it with interest. In a matter of money, it is a common thing to pay a debt out of course, and before it be due; but we account ourselves to owe nothing for a good office; whereas the benefit increases by delay. So insensible are we of the most important affair of human life! That man were doubtless in a miserable condition, that could neither see, nor hear, nor taste, nor feel, nor smell; but how much more unhappy is he then that, wanting a sense of benefits, loses the greatest comfort in nature in the bliss of giving and receiving them? He that takes a benefit as it is meant is in the right; for the benefactor has then his end, and his only end, when the receiver is grateful.

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  • The Nicomachean ethics of Aristotle · Aristotle (-384–-322) · Chapter XIII.

    Now this results from the fact, that all men, or the generality at least, wish what is honourable, but, when tested, choose what is profitable; and the doing kindnesses disinterestedly is honourable while receiving benefits is profitable. In such cases one should, if able, make a return proportionate to the good received, and do so willingly, because one ought not to make a disinterested friend[9] of a man against his inclination: one should act, I say, as having made a mistake originally in receiving kindness from one from whom one ought not to have received it, he being not a friend nor doing the act disinterestedly; one should therefore discharge one’s self of the obligation as having received a kindness on specified terms: and if able a man would engage to repay the kindness, while if he were unable even the doer of it would not expect it of him: so that if he is able he ought to repay it. But one ought at the first to ascertain from whom one is receiving kindness, and on what understanding, that on that same understanding one may accept it or not. A question admitting of dispute is whether one is to measure a kindness by the good done to the receiver of it, and make this the standard by which to requite, or by the kind intention of the doer?

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