The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature
William James (1842–1910)
described by negatives, 417; his attributes, scholastic proof of, 439; the metaphysical ones are for us meaningless, 445; the moral ones are ill-deduced, 447; he is not a mere inference, 502; is used, not known, 506; his existence must make a difference among phenomena, 517, 522; his relation to the subconscious region, 242, 515; his tasks, 519; may be finite and plural, 525. Goddard, 96. Goerres, 407. Goethe, 137. Gough, 203. Gourdon, 171. “Grace,” the operation of, 226; the state of, 260. Gratry, 146, 476, 506. Greeks, their pessimism, 86, 142. Guidance, 472. Gurney, 527. Guyon, 276, 286. Hadley, 201, 268. Hale, 82. Hamon, 367. Happiness, 47-49, 79, 248, 279. Harnack, 100. Healthy-mindedness, Lectures IV and V, passim; its philosophy of evil, 131; compared with morbid-mindedness, 162, 488. Heart, softening of, 267. Hegel, 389, 449, 454. Helmont, Van, 497. Heroism, 364, 488, note. Heterogeneous personality, 169, 193. Higher criticism, 4. Hilty, 79, 275, 472. Hodgson, R., 524. Homer, 86. Hugo, 171. Hypocrisy, 338. Hypothesis, what make a useful one, 517. Hyslop, 524. Ignatius Loyola, 313, 406, 410. Illness, 113. “Imitation of Christ,” the, 44. Immortality, 524. Impulses, 261. Individuality, 501. Inhibitions, 261 ff. Insane melancholy and religion, 144. Insanity and genius, 16; and happiness, 279. Institutional religion, 335. Intellect a secondary force in religion, 431, 514. Intellectual weakness of some saints, 370. Intolerance, 342. Irascibility, 264. Jesus, Harnack on, 100. Job, 76, 448. John, Saint, of the Cross, 304, 407, 413. Johnston, 258. Jonquil, 476. Jordan, 347. Jouffroy, 176, 198. Judgments, existential and spiritual, 4. Kant, 54, 448. Karma, 522.
Kellner, 401. Kindliness, see Charity. Kingsley, 385. Lagneau, 285. Leaders, see Religious leaders. Leaders, of tribes, 371. Lejeune, 113, 312. Lessing, 318. Leuba, 201, 203, 220, 246, 506. Life, its significance, 151. Life, the subconscious, 207, 209. Locker-Lampson, 39. Logic, Hegelian, 449. Louis, Saint, of Gonzaga, 350. Love, see Charity. Love, cases of falling out of, 179. Love of God, 276. Love your enemies, 278, 283. Lowell, 65. Loyalty, to God, 342. Lutfullah, 164. Luther, 128, 137, 244, 330, 348, 382. Lutheran self-despair, 108, 211. Luxury, 365. Lycaon, 86. Lyre, 267. Mahomet, 171. See Mohammed. Marcus Aurelius, 42, 44, 474. Margaret Mary, see Alacoque. Margin of consciousness, 232. Marshall, 503. Martineau, 475. Mather, 303. Maudsley, 19. Meaning of life, 151. Medical criticism of religion, 413. Medical materialism, 10 ff. Melancholy, 145, 279; Lectures V and VI, passim; cases of, 148, 149, 157, 159, 198. Melting moods, 267. Method of judging value of religion, 18, 327. Methodism, 227, 237. Meysenbug, 395. Militarism, 365-367. Military type of character, 371. Mill, 204. Mind-cure, its sources and history, 94-97; its opinion of fear, 98; cases of, 102-105, 120, 123; its message, 108; its methods, 112-123; it uses verification, 120-124; its philosophy of evil, 131. Miraculous character of conversion, 227. Mohammed, 341, 481. Molinos, 130. Moltke, Von, 264, 367. Monasteries, 296. Monism, 416. Morbidness compared with healthy-mindedness, 488. See, also, Melancholy. Mormon revelations, 482. Mortification, see Asceticism. Muir, 482. Mulford, 497. Müller, 468. Murisier, 349. Myers, 233, 234, 466, 511, 524. Mystic states, their effects, 21, 414. Mystical experiences, 66.
Mysticism, Lectures XVI and XVII, passim; its marks, 380; its theoretic results, 416, 422, 428; it cannot warrant truth, 422; its results, 425; its relation to the sense of union, 509. Mystical region of experience, 515. Natural theology, 492. Naturalism, 141, 167. Nature, scientific view of, 491. Negative accounts of deity, 417. Nelson, 208, 423. Nettleton, 215. Newman, F. W., 80. Newman, J. H., on dogmatic theology, 434, 442; his type of imagination, 459. Nietzsche, 371, 372. Nitrous oxide, its mystical effects, 387. No-function, 261-263, 299, 387, 416. Non-resistance, 281, 358, 376. Obedience, 310. Obermann, 476. O'Connell, 257. Omit, 296. “Once-born” type, 80, 166, 363, 488. Oneness with God, see Union. Optimism, systematic, 88; and evolutionism, 91; it may be shallow, 364. Orderliness of world, 438. Organism determines all mental states whatsoever, 14. Origin of mental states no criterion of their value, 14 ff. Orison, 406. Over-beliefs, 513; the author's, 515. Over-soul, 516. Oxford, graduate of, 220, 268. Pagan feeling, 86. Pantheism, 131, 416. Parker, 83. Pascal, 286. Paton, 359. Paul, Saint, 171, 357. Peek, 253. Peirce, 444. Penny, 323. Perreyve, 505. Persecutions, 338, 342. Personality, explained away by science, 119, 491; heterogeneous, 169; alterations of, 193, 210 ff.; is reality, 499. See Character. Peter, Saint, of Alcantara, 360. Philo, 481. Philosophy, Lecture XVIII, passim; must coerce assent, 433; scholastic, 439; idealistic, 448; unable to give a theoretic warrant to faith, 455; its true office in religion, 455. Photisms, 251. Piety, 339 ff. Pluralism, 131. Polytheism, 131, 526. Poverty, 315, 367. “Pragmatism,” 444, 519, 522-524. Prayer, 463; its definition, 464;
its essence, 465; petitional, 467; its effects, 474-477, 523. “Presence,” sense of, 58-63. Presence of God, 66-72, 272, 275 ff., 396, 418. Presence of God, the practice of, 116. Primitive human thought, 495. Pringle-Pattison, 454. Prophets, the Hebrew, 479. Protestant theology, 244. Protestantism and Catholicism, 114, 227, 330, 461. Providential leading, 472. Psychopathy and religion, 22 ff. Puffer, 394. Purity, 274, 290, 348. Quakers, 7, 291. Ramakrishna, 361, 365. Rationalism, 73, 74; its authority overthrown by mysticism, 428. Ratisbonne, 223, 257. Reality of unseen objects, Lecture III, passim. Récéjac, 407, 509. “Recollection,” 116, 289. Redemption, 157. Reformation of character, 320. Regeneration, see Conversion; by relaxation, 111. Reid, 446. Relaxation, salvation by, 110. See Surrender. Religion, to be tested by fruits, not by origin, 10 ff., 331; its definition, 26, 31; is solemn, 37; compared with Stoicism, 41; its unique function, 51; abstractness of its objects, 54; differs according to temperament, 75, 135, 333, and ought to differ, 487; considered to be a “survival,” 118, 490, 498; its relations to melancholy, 145; worldly passions may combine with it, 337; its essential characters, 369, 485; its relation to prayer, 463-466; asserts a fact, not a theory, 489; its truth, 377; more than science, it holds by concrete reality, 500; attempts to evaporate it into philosophy, 502; it is concerned with personal destinies, 491, 503; with feeling and conduct, 504; is a sthenic affection, 505; is for life, not for knowledge, 506; its essential contents, 508; it postulates issues of fact, 518. Religious emotion, 279. Religious leaders, often nervously unstable, 6 ff., 30;
their loneliness, 335. “Religious sentiment,” 27. Renan, 37. Renunciations, 349. Repentance, 127. Resignation, 286. Revelation, the anæsthetic, 387-393. Revelations, see Automatisms. Revelations, in Mormon Church, 482. Revivalism, 228. Ribet, 407. Ribot, 145, 502. Rodriguez, 313, 314, 317. Royce, 454. Rutherford, Mark, 76. Sabatier, A., 464. Sacrifice, 303, 462. Saint-Pierre, 83. Sainte-Beuve, 260, 315. Saintliness, Sainte-Beuve on, 260; its characteristics, 272, 370; criticism of, 326 ff. Saintly conduct, 356-377. Saints, dislike of natural man for, 371. Salvation, 526. Sandays, 480. Satan, in picture, 50. Scheffler, 417. Scholastic arguments for God, 437. Science, ignores personality and teleology, 491; her “facts,” 500, 501. “Science of Religions,” 433, 455, 456, 488-490. Scientific conceptions, their late adoption, 496. Second-birth, 157, 165, 166. Seeley, 77. Self of the world, 449. Self-despair, 110, 129, 208. Self-surrender, 110, 208. Sénancour, 476. Seth, 454. Sexual temptation, 269. Sexuality as cause of religion, 10, 11. “Shrew,” 347. Sickness, 113. Sick souls, Lectures V and VI, passim. Sighele, 263. Sin, 209. Sinners, Christ died for, 129. Skepticism, 332 ff. Skobeleff, 265. Smith, Joseph, 482. Softening of the heart, 267. Solemnity, 37, 48. Soul, 195. Soul, strength of, 273. Spencer, 355, 374. Spinoza, 9, 127. Spiritism, 514. Spirit-return, 524. Spiritual judgments, 4. Spiritual states, tests of their value, 18. Starbuck, 198, 199, 204, 206, 208-210, 249, 253, 258, 268, 276, 323, 353, 394. Stevenson, 138, 296. Stoicism, 42-45, 143. Strange appearance of world, 151. Strength of soul, 273. Subconscious action in conversion, 236, 242. Subconscious life, 115, 207, 209, 233, 236, 270, 483.
Passages expressing a similar idea
The Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason
[43] The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity. From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.
Read in contextThe Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof
The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their determinate conception—into the possession of which they have come, they know not how—over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience—though in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience. Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all.
Read in contextThe Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · APPENDIX. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason
The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of an idea), and not as a regulative principle, is the error of inactive reason (ignava ratio).[72] We may so term every principle which requires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete, and allows reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully executed its task. Thus the psychological idea of the ego, when employed as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul, and for the extension of our knowledge regarding this subject beyond the limits of experience—even to the condition of the soul after death—is convenient enough for the purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even ruinous to its interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The dogmatizing spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality through all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking substance, the interest which we take in things and events that can happen only after our death, from a consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses with all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal phenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely natural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason, he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience, greatly to his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of all, genuine insight and intelligence.
Read in contextThe Critique of Pure Reason · Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) · Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas
[42] The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and it aims at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means for the attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement—the synthetical one—would be the most suitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to us—psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.
Read in contextEthics — Part 1 · Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677) · Section 4
We have now perceived, that all the explanations commonly given of nature are mere modes of imagining, and do not indicate the true nature of anything, but only the constitution of the imagination; and, although they have names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imagination, I call them entities imaginary rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted. Many argue in this way. If all things follow from a necessity of the absolutely perfect nature of God, why are there so many imperfections in nature? such, for instance, as things corrupt to the point of putridity, loathsome deformity, confusion, evil, sin, &c. But these reasoners are, as I have said, easily confuted, for the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; things are not more or less perfect, according as they are serviceable or repugnant to mankind. To those who ask why God did not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason, I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi. Such are the misconceptions I have undertaken to note; if there are any more of the same sort, everyone may easily dissipate them for himself with the aid of a little reflection. END OF PART I
Read in contextSix metaphysical meditations: Wherein it is proved that there is a God and that mans mind is really distinct from his body · René Descartes (1596–1650) · Meditat. VI. Of Corporeal Beings, and Their Existence: As Also of the Real Difference, Between Mind and Body.
But there is also in me a certain Passive Faculty of sense, or of Receiving and Knowing the Ideas of sensible Things; of which Faculty I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certain Active Faculty of Producing and Effecting those Ideas. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no Understanding, and those Ideas are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against my Will. There remains therefore no Place for this Active Faculty, but that it should be in some substance different from me. In which because all the Reallity, which is contain’d Objectively in the Ideas Produced by that Faculty, ought to be contain’d Formally or Eminently (as I have Formerly taken notice) this substance must be either a Body (in which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain’d Formally) or it Must Be God, or some Creature more excellent then a Body (In which what is in the Ideas Objectively is contain’d Eminently). But seeing that God is not a Deceivour, ’tis altogether Manifest, that he does not Place these Ideas in me either Immediately from himself, or Mediately from any other Creature, wherein their Objective Reallity is not * contain’d Formally, but only Eminently. And seeing God has given me no Faculty to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from Corporeal or Incorporeal Beings, but rather a strong Inclination to believe that they are sent from Corporeal Beings, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any Where, but from Corporeal Things. Therefore we must conclude that there are Corporeal Beings. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by my sense (for Perception by sense is in many Things very Obscure and Confused) but those things at least, which I clearly and distinctly Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the Object of Pure Mathematicks; those things I say at least are True.
Read in context